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The CEO’s compensation policy is one of the most important factors in an organization’s 
success.  CEO’s stock options are awarded to align the interests of the CEO with the interests of 
the firms’ stakeholders.  However, lack of understanding of the relationship between firm 
performance and a CEO’s stock options could threaten the alignment of a CEO’s interests with 
those of the stakeholders.  Grounded in agency theory, the purpose of this correlation study was 
to examine the relationship between return on equity, return on investment, total annual 
revenues, and CEOs’ stock options awards, while controlling for firm size, age of CEO, and 
CEO tenure.  Archival data from 99 U.S. pharmaceutical companies were analyzed using 
hierarchical linear regression.  The results of the hierarchical regression analysis indicated a 
significant predictive model F(6, 262) = 42.065, p < 0.05, R2 = .343.  However, in the final 
model, only firm size and CEO tenure were significant.  In addition, there was no significant 
relationship between return on equity, return on investments, and annual revenues to CEOs’ 
stock options.  The implications for positive social change include the potential for policy 
makers to utilize findings in furthering dialogue related to income inequality and feeling of 
unfair distribution of valuable resources in the society.  Pharmaceutical business leaders might 
affect social change by structuring CEOs’ compensation based on firm performance, 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
The explosive use of stock options to compensate CEOs’ has increased CEO’s 
compensation significantly (Essid, 2012).  The justification often given for generous 
stock options awards is that stock options effectively link CEO’s compensation to 
corporate performance (Murphy & Trefftzs, 2012).  In general, stock options should help 
align CEO’s incentives with those of the shareholders (Essid, 2012).  The argument for 
paying a CEO with stock options is that it serves as an incentive to executives to increase 
shareholders value (Essid, 2012).  In most publicly held companies, the compensation of 
top executives is virtually independent of performance (Akinloye & Hussein, 2012).  
However, with respect to pay for performance, compensation policy is one of the most 
important factors in organization success (Moore, 2014).  Shareholders rely on the CEO 
to adopt policies that maximize the value of their shares (Moore, 2014).  It is with this 
regard of maximizing shareholders value that makes stock options a primary form of 
compensation for the CEOs’, to align the interests of the CEOs’ with those of diversified 
stockholders (Essid, 2012).  Therefore, an understanding of the relationship between 
CEO’s stock options and firm performance could influence pharmaceutical industry 
compensation committees to make better decisions when structuring CEOs’ 
compensation.   





Background of the Problem 
Firms grant executive stock options (ESOs’) to chief executive officers (CEOs’) 
to increase CEO’s exposure to stock prices as a way to align CEO’s compensation with 
the shareholders’ (Khalid & Rehman, 2014).  By linking executive pay to shareholders’ 
wealth, stock options purportedly help reduce agency costs that arise from the separation 
of ownership and control in corporations (Khalid & Rehman, 2014).  The increased use 
of stock options as an option to tie executive pay to firm performance has experienced 
considerable scrutiny from regulators and shareholders (Akinloye & Hussein, 2012).  The 
increased scrutiny resulted, in part, because of stock option backdating and abuses of 
executive pay as companies jettisoned executive stock option payment (Murphy & 
Trefftzs, 2012). 
While the rationale for awarding stock options to executives seemed apparent, 
tying executive compensation to firm performance was not clear.  Guthrie, Sokolowsky 
and Wan (2012) stated that although stock options awarded to CEO should reflect firm 
performance, other factors influenced executive’s pay.  Study results on the relationship 
between ESO’s compensation and firm performance were inconclusive (Akinloye, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2012).  Guthrie et al. argued on the CEO’s ability to 
extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms.  
Akinloye investigated the relationship between executive pay and earning measure and 
found that awarding stock options to executives increased future earnings.  Kanagaretnam 




The increased use of stock options as an option to tie executive pay to firm 
performance has received considerable scrutiny from regulators and shareholders 
(Akinloye & Hussein, 2012).  Hall and Kelvin (2003) noted that during the 1990s, the 
average pay for CEOs’ of S&P 500 grew from $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million; 
while stock options grants grew nine-fold, averaging approximately $800,000 in 1992 to 
$7.2 million in 2000.  The general business problem is that lack of understanding of the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO’s stock options could threaten the 
alignment of CEO’s interests with those of the stakeholders’.  The specific business 
problem is that some compensation committees have limited knowledge of the 
relationship between return on equity, return on investment, annual revenues, and CEO’s 
stock options awarded, while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between return on equity, return on investment, annual revenues, and CEO’s 
stock options awarded, while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure.  The independent variables were the return on equity (ROE), return on investment 
(ROI), and annual revenues.  The dependent variable was the value of CEO’s stock 
options awarded.  Controlling variables were firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure.  The targeted population was comprised of publicly traded pharmaceutical 
companies located within the United States.  The implications for positive social change 
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include the potential to address societal concerns on increasing concentration of wealth to 
very high-earning salaried workers, in particular, CEOs’, and thereby improving 
economic and social distribution in the society (Bakija & Heim, 2012).  The results of 
this study may also help improve the culture of transparency, dialogue, fairness, and trust 
in the work place (Moore, 2014). 
Nature of the Study 
In this study, I used the quantitative method.  According to Westerman (2012), 
researchers using quantitative methods emphasize objective measurements and the 
statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis of data.  Therefore, the quantitative 
method was appropriate for this study, for deductive testing and investigating whether a 
relationship existed between firm performance and CEO’s stock options, while 
controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  A qualitative study is an 
in-depth exploration of phenomena that exist in the context of the real world by using 
interpretive techniques to understand, decode, and provide meaningful meaning to the 
phenomena (Cooper & Schindler, 2013; Zohrabi, 2013).  Qualitative approach was not 
appropriate for this study because the method is appropriate for exploratory studies that 
involve open-ended interviews or observations of human participants (Zohrabi, 2013).  
However, the objective of this study was to test hypothesis, and hence a quantitative 
method was more appropriate.  
I chose the correlational design for this study.  Researchers conduct correlation 
research to determine the extent of the relationship between two or more variables using 
statistical data (Moore, 2014).  A correlational design was an appropriate design for this 
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study as the goal was to examine the relationship between firm performance and CEO’s 
stock options.  Other designs, such as descriptive and experimental, were not appropriate 
for this research.  With descriptive design, the researcher seeks to describe the status of 
an identified variable (Joanne, 2012). With experimental design, the researcher seeks to 
establish a cause-and-effect relationship among a group of variables to influence the 
outcome of a behavioral study (Joanne, 2012).  However, to explore relationships 
between variables, a correlational study was more appropriate.    
Research Question 
What is the relationship between return on equity, return on investment, annual 
revenues, and CEO’s stock options awards, while controlling for firm size, age of the 
CEO, and the CEO’s tenure?  
Hypotheses 
H01: Return on equity, return on investments, and annual revenues would not 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, 
and the CEO’s tenure. 
Ha1: Return on equity, return on investments, and annual revenues would 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, 
and the CEO’s tenure. 
Theoretical Framework 
I utilized agency theory in this study.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) first developed 
agency theory.  Scholars use agency theory to explain the relationship between managers 
and shareholders (Essid, 2012).  Agency theorists suggested that, in imperfect labor and 
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capital markets, managers might seek to maximize their own utility (CEOs’ stock 
options) at the expense of corporate stakeholder (ROE and ROI) (Essid, 2012).  
According to agency theorists, agents might operate in their own self-interest because 
they have more information than the principal and might make decisions that enhance 
their wealth at the expense of the shareholders (Ross, 1973).  This information imbalance 
between the principal and the agent affects the principals’ ability to monitor whether the 
agent is properly acting in the best interests of the principal (Essid, 2012).   
Evidence of self-interest by the agent includes the consumption of some corporate 
resources in the form of perquisites and the avoidance of optimal risky positions (Brown, 
2013).  Avoidance of risky situations could include risk-averse managers bypassing 
profitable opportunities when shareholders of the firm would prefer the firm to invest 
(Arbogast & Mirabella, 2014).  Outside investors recognize that the agent may make 
decisions contrary to their best interests (Akinloye, 2012).  Accordingly, investors will 
discount the price they are willing to pay for securities of the firm (Arbogast & Mirabella, 
2014).  To monitor the agent, the principal may incur monitoring costs such as auditing 
the financial statements (Moore, 2014).  
Definition of Terms 
Definitions of the terms in this study are as follow: 




Employee stock option.  A contract offered by a company to the employee, 
granting the employee the right to buy a fixed number of company shares in the future at 
a fixed price (Nancy & Fall, 2012). 
Firm size.  A measurement of total assets of a firm (Tzu-Ching, Chia-Hsuan, & 
Chun-Ho, 2014). 
Proxy statement.  A document required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) showing compensation paid to CEO and other executives of a public 
company (SEC, 2014).   
Return on equity (ROE).  Shareholders’ return, measured as net income divided 
by the book value of common shareholders’ equity (Sigler, 2003). 
Return on investment (ROI).  Firms return, measured as net income divided by 
total assets (Arbogast & Mirabella, 2014). 
Tenure.  The number of years the executive has served as CEO of the 
pharmaceutical firm (Sigler, 2003).   
Vesting period.  Specifies the time that an employee must wait to acquire full 
ownership of stock options (Baker, Wright, & Chernoff, 2013).   
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
Assumptions are factors in the research considered true without any proof based 
on the study design (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013).  First, I assumed that the rationale for 
awarding stock options to the CEO is to align the CEO’s interests with the interests of the 
shareholders.  Second, I assumed that firms provide accurate financial information in 
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their reporting to the SEC.  In addition, my third assumption was that correlational design 
is appropriate to investigate the relationship between firm performance and CEO’s stock 
options. 
Limitations 
Limitations are influences, conditions, or shortcomings that a researcher cannot 
control (Coffie, 2013).  There are several limitations noted in this study.  First, the sample 
consisted only U.S. pharmaceutical companies and the results might not translate to other 
industries.  The lack of transferability of the data to other industries may be due to 
differing business practices (Atherton, 2012).  Second, the use of secondary data, data 
collected for a different objective such as financial reporting and not for the purpose of 
this study, could potentially have introduced errors to the conclusions and designs of the 
current study.  Any inaccuracy in archived data would negatively affect the accuracy of a 
study (Miranda, 2015).  Third, the selected time span of the study (2007-2015) was a 
restrictive factor. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations are those characteristics that limit the scope and define the 
boundaries of a study (Moore, 2014).  The focus of this study was limited to only U.S. 
publicly traded pharmaceutical companies for the years 2007-2015.  I examined only 
companies with availability of financial data throughout the study period.  The study 
variables on firm performance were limited to only ROE, ROI, and annual revenues.  
Firm performance data was restricted to data filed with only to the SEC. Controlled 
variables were firm size, age of CEO, and CEO’s tenure.  In addition, in this study, I 
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focused only on the CEO, and not on other high-level executives such as the chief 
financial officer, chief accounting officer, or chief technology officer.  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study arises from several gaps in understanding the use of 
executive stock option awards in the pharmaceutical industry to align CEOs’ 
compensation with the performance of the firm.  First, this study may help in addressing 
societal concerns on economic inequality due to increasing concentration of wealth to 
very high-earning salaried workers.  Second, the results of this study may help improve 
the culture of transparency, dialogue, fairness, and trust in the work place.  Third, 
compensation committees in U.S. pharmaceutical industry may use the results of this 
study in structuring CEO’s stock option schemes and in the alignment of executives’ 
compensation to stakeholders’ interests. 
Contribution to Business Practice 
After the 2008 financial downturn, government regulators have put the spotlight 
on executive pay calling for more disclosures and prompting questions about the best 
way to structure compensation (Pham, 2015).  According to Gerard (2014), influence, 
sympathy, friendship, loyalty, and neglect, rather than performance, affect CEOs’ pay.  
The goal of a corporation is to maximize the long-term value of the firm and aligning 
CEO’s incentives with all the stakeholders’ interest is important (Essad, 2012).  With 
respect to pay for performance, compensation policy is one of the most important factors 
in organization success (Moore, 2014).  Therefore, the results of this study might 
contribute to new knowledge for compensation committees in designing CEO’s pay 
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packages that aligns with the shareholders’ interests.  In addition, the results of this study 
may help improve the culture of transparency, dialogue, fairness, and trust in the work 
place. 
Implications for Social Change  
The implications for positive social change include the potential to address 
societal concerns on increases in inequality due to increasing concentration of wealth at 
the top, to high-earning salaried workers.  From 1978 to 2013, CEO’s compensation 
increased 937%, substantially greater than the painfully slow 10.2% growth of a typical 
worker’s compensation over the same period (Economic Policy Institute, 2014).  Wealth 
and inequality awaken justice concerns (Bakija & Heim, 2012).  According to Bakija and 
Heim (2012), between 1997 and 2005, executives, managers, and finance professionals 
accounted for 60% of the top 0.1% income earners, and accounted for 70% of the 
increase in the share of national income going to the top 0.1% of income earners.   
Kiatpongsan and Norton (2014) noted that to maintain high salaries, some firms 
reduced research and development (R&D) budgets or downsized employees.  In addition, 
people in the society believe that there is unfair distribution of valuable resources such as 
income (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014).  Implications for positive social change include a 
better understanding of the increasing income inequality, including feelings of unfairness, 
and improving employment opportunities.  Firms paying their CEOs’ based on 
performance are likely to invest more on R&D (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  
Investing more on R&D could bring innovation and employment opportunities to the 
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society.  Moreover, understanding pay inequality offers guidance for policy makers on 
how to address this societal concern.  
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature  
The literature review contains an examination of the literature on the use of 
CEO’s stock options within the pharmaceutical industry as a form of executive incentive.  
Strategies for review of academic literature included the use of Walden databases (Sage, 
ProQuest, Business Source Complete) as well as academic and professional databases 
(SEC, Standard & Poor’s).  I searched keywords and phrases including pharmaceutical 
industries, stock options, the compensation committee, revenues, return on equity, return 
on investments, and CEOs’ compensation.  Parameters for the search were peer-reviewed 
journals published within the past 5 years.  The literature review contained 105 
references, 85% of the 178 references (see Table 1).  The section begins with a 
restatement of the purpose statement and the study hypothesis.  I reviewed the academic 
literature and organized my study by the following themes: agency theory, executive 
compensation, stock options, and firm performance.   
Table 1 
Count of References Used in Doctoral Study Proposal 
Type Recent 
(within 5 years of 
2016) 
Older 
(more than 5 years of 
2016) 
Total % 
Books 8 1 9 5% 
Conferences 0 0 0 0% 
Dissertations 6 1 7 4% 
Journal Articles 132 23 155 87% 
Org. Report 7 0 7 4% 
Websites 0 0 0 0% 




The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between ROE, ROI, annual revenues, and CEO’s stock options awarded, 
while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The independent 
variables were the ROE, ROI, and total annual revenues.  The dependent variable was the 
value of CEO’s stock options granted.  Controlling variables were firm size, age of the 
CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The targeted population comprised of publicly traded 
pharmaceutical companies located within the United States.  The implications for positive 
social change include the potential to address societal concerns on increasing 
concentration of wealth to very high-earning salaried workers, in particular, CEOs’, and 
thereby improving economic and social distribution in the society (Bakija & Heim, 
2012).  The results of this study may also help improve the culture of transparency, 
dialogue, fairness, and trust in the work place (Moore, 2014).  The null hypothesis of this 
study was that ROE, ROI, and annual revenues would not significantly predict CEO’s 
stock options, while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The 
alternative hypothesis of this study was that ROE, ROI, and annual revenues would 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, while controlling for firm size, age of the 
CEO, and the CEO’s tenure. 
Agency Theory 
Jensen and Murphy (1976) set the tone of discussion on CEOs’ pay.  Agency 
theory is the foundation of the relationship between firm performance and CEO’s pay 
(Akinloye, 2012).  According to Jensen and Murphy, it is appropriate to pay CEOs’ based 
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on shareholders’ wealth because wealth is shareholders’ objective (Ryan, Whitler, & 
Semadeni, 2014).  The majority of researchers on agency theory have addressed the 
question of how CEO’s compensation relates to firm performance and what influences 
this relationship (Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012).  The assumption underlying agency 
theory is that agents tend to be selfish and opportunistic and, unless monitored 
adequately, will exploit owner-principals (Miller, Sarsdais, & Case, 2012).  According to 
agency theory, the agent is assumed to have greater knowledge than does the principal 
(Moore, 2014).  Further, the agent might act in his or her self-interest by exploiting the 
information advantage that the principal does not possess (Moore, 2014).  High-profile 
corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom have underscored this conflict between 
agent and principal (Essid, 2012).  Top corporate management could malfunction and 
manipulate critical information (such as earnings) and attempt to deceive the unwary 
pubic (Syriopoulos & Tsatsaronis, 2012).  Therefore, structuring managers’ 
compensation to reduce agency costs and encourage managers to act in the best interests 
of the shareholders forms the foundation of agency theory.  
When the motives and objectives of shareholders and company senior managers 
are different, agency costs are incurred (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Shareholders hire 
managers because they have specialized resources that increase firm value.  Unless 
offered proper incentives, managers will not maximize shareholders’ wealth (Paz, 2012).  
One way to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders is to make managers’ 
compensation a function of firm performance (Sigler, 2011).  In a typical principal-agent 
relationship, the agent could act in his or her own self-interest by exploiting information 
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asymmetry, in that the agent has more information or knowledge than the principal does 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The information asymmetry that exists between 
knowledgeable agents and owners could provide the basis for this opportunism, which 
the agent will act upon unless controlled or incentivized not to do so (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  It is because of efforts to resolve agency and principal conflict that agency theory 
has become the most widely used concept to explain executive compensation (Akinloye, 
2012).   
The foundation of agency theory is the contract that governs the relationship 
between principals and agents (Paz, 2012).  Because of agent and principal conflict, 
agency theorists recommend that managerial compensation contracts include designs 
such that when managers increase the value of the firm, they also increase their expected 
utility (Mitnick, 2013).  According to Sania and Mobeen (2014), monitoring the 
management and by aligning CEO’s wealth with firm value reduces agency costs.  The 
argument here is that incentives alignment must be less than the reduction in agency costs 
(Essid, 2012). 
One way to increase shareholders’ value through performance is for firms to 
invest more in research and development (R&D).  Executive leadership is an important 
part of the revitalization of a firm (Tien & Chen, 2012).  Tien and Chen (2012) examined 
the relationship between CEO’s compensation and the behavioral momentum of 
innovation in R&D within the firm.  The rationale behind Tien and Chen’s study was that 
executive compensation affects organizational behavior and firm performance; therefore, 
proper incentives could motivate CEOs’ to engage in strategic change.   
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Ownership structure is a cause of agency problems and, according to agency 
theory, giving managers equity ownership of the firm could reduce this issue (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976).  The theoretical rationale behind the use of equity-based executive 
compensation is to link executive wealth to the stock price, aligning the CEO’s own 
interests with shareholders’ interest (Gerard, 2014).  The divergence of interests between 
the agent and principal is the perspective that makes some researchers argue that the 
motivational potentials of stock options should inspire top executives to act in a way that 
maximizes shareholders’ value (Akinloye & Hussein, 2012).  Managers are typically risk 
averse, and equity incentives should induce managers to undertake risky projects to 
maximize firm value and improve firm performance (Dicks, 2012). 
It is not clear to what extent equity compensation could reduce agency problems 
and, in turn, increase firm performance (Denning, 2013).  Denning (2013) reviewed 
Standard & Poor’s CEOs’ data from 1992 to 2003 and analyzed the impact of equity 
incentives to CEO’s risk-taking.  Leaders of firms must take risks to make use of 
opportunities and improve performance.  Denning examined the connection between 
stock option compensation, risk-taking, and firm performance.  Denning found that an 
incentive effect using equity compensation only occurs when the level of equity 
compensation is relatively small, and overused equity incentives reduced CEO’s risk-
taking motivation.   
Use of equity incentives to reduce agency costs is justified because CEOs’ have 
significant human capital tied to the firm and are less diversified, as compared with 
outside directors.  Managers’ expected utility depends on the distribution of payoffs by 
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the firm (Mitnick, 2013).  However, with significant human capital tied to the firm, 
managers could pass off risk, ignoring projects that would benefit the shareholders’ value 
(Hayes et al., 2012).  Hayes et al. (2012) reviewed CEO’s compensation data from fiscal 
years 2002 through 2008 to analyze CEO’s compensation and CEO’s risk-taking 
behavior.  Hayes et al. found no relationship between equity compensation and risk-
taking behavior of the firm, but accounting changes in reporting of stock options was an 
important factor affecting the use of equity incentives rather than firm performance.  
According to Hayes et al. accounting changes rather than the alignment of the CEO’s 
compensation to the firm performance to reduce agency costs influenced awarding of 
stock options to the CEO.   
Organizations that that are subject to fewer external constraints are predicted to 
exhibit higher agency costs in the form of greater excess compensation to the CEO 
(Gaver & Im, 2014).  Gaver and Im (2014) analyzed financial data from nonprofit 
organizations from 1992 to 2007.  Gaver and Im found that excess CEO’s compensation 
had a negative association with external funding sources but positively related to funding 
from investment income.  Gaver and Im found that organizations that received funding 
from outside sources were subject to monitoring from their sources of financing.  
However, organizations that relied on investment earnings had less monitoring.  Gaver 
and Im concluded that demand for monitoring by fund providers was associated with 
agency problem, because managers had incentives to expropriate external funds than 
investments income.  
17 
 
The board of directors sets compensation packages of the top five firm executives 
(Moore, 2014).  Since Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) study, management scholars have 
posited that both the role of the board of directors and ownership structure are crucial in 
monitoring managerial activity to reduce agency cost.  Moreover, regulatory bodies such 
as the SEC and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have outlined the role of the board of 
directors in monitoring firm executives (Essid, 2012).  To improve corporate governance, 
the NYSE, National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ), and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have included guidance on how to improve 
board monitoring in the firm (Álvarez-Pérez & Neira-Fontela, 2013).  Both the NYSE 
and NASDAQ now require that the majority of the board of directors should be 
independent and that the firm has fully independent nominating, compensation, and 
auditing committees (Guthrie et al., 2012).  In addition, companies listed on the NYSE 
must comply with Section 303A, which is consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
on corporate governance standards (NYSE, 2014).  These regulatory requirements are to 
help present a clear, concise, and understandable disclosure about the compensation paid 
to the executives of public companies (SEC, 2014).  
The board of directors is the governing body to which shareholders delegate the 
responsibility of overseeing, compensating, and substituting managers as well as 
approving major strategic projects (Jesus & Emma, 2013).  Some researchers have argued 
that the board might not be effective in mitigating agency problems.  Lin and Lin (2014) 
analyzed whether directors’ compensation has an effect on CEO’s compensation by 
analyzing 713 firms from the period of 2007 to 2010.  Lin and Lin incorporated the 
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characteristics of the board of directors’ compensation in addition to CEO’s 
characteristics to examine CEO’s compensation.  In the study, Lin and Lin found a 
positive relationship between CEO’s power to CEO’s compensation and a negative 
relationship to directors’ compensation.  Lin and Lin attributed CEO’s power to CEO’s 
tenure, revealing that CEOs’ who had lengthy tenures were likely to dominate the board 
of directors, causing agency problems.  Lin and Lin also found that highly paid directors 
were not paid based on their performance but by a mutual back-scratching relationship 
between the CEO’s and the board of directors.  It is therefore likely that the CEO might 
receive higher compensation not based on performance but by dominating the board of 
directors.   
To understand how the board of directors influenced CEO’s compensation and 
firm performance, Nyoamong and Temesgen (2013) investigated the relationship 
between the board of directors’ governance variables and bank performance in Kenya.  
This study was important because it looked at banking in Kenya, where problems in the 
banking sector included 37 banks having collapsed between 1986 and 1998.  Nyoamong 
and Temesgen analyzed board size, independence of directors, and CEO’s duality.  
Nyoamong and Temesgen found that large board sizes tended to have a negative impact 
on bank performance.  Nyoamong and Temesgen also found a positive association 
between a greater number of independent directors and higher performance.  Nyoamong 
and Temesgen recommended that to improve performance, increasing the number of 
independent directors was more effective for corporate governance and a sound financial 
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system.  Increasing the number of independent directors is likely to improve monitoring 
and reduce agency costs.        
Guthrie et al. (2012) examined U.S. public firms and found that the requirement 
of a majority of independent directors on the board affected the level of CEO’s pay.  
Guthrie et al. analyzed the governance compliance of 865 firms to examine the link 
between CEO’s pay and independence of the board.  Guthrie et al. found that (a) board 
independence did not affect the level of CEO’s pay, (b) compensation committee 
independence caused CEO’s pay to increase, and (c) increases in CEO’s pay occurred 
only in the presence of block-holder directors or high institutional ownership 
concentration.  High CEO’s pay in firms with either block-holders or high institutional 
ownership contradicted agency theory because there are few shareholders and easier to 
monitor the CEO effectively (Guthrie et al., 2012).  Guthrie et al. also noted that there 
was little evidence that board reforms had any meaningful effect on CEO’s pay.  Guthrie 
et al. study results casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in 
constraining CEO’s pay in firms with stronger shareholder monitoring.       
Evidence has shown that boards and shareholders possess the ability to increase 
an incentive based on the long-term nature of the compensation contract rather than 
through fixed pay to motivate executives (Akinloye, 2012).  However, while agent 
theorists propose the need to align the agent and the principal interests, modern 
businesses present unique challenges (Gaver & Im, 2014).  According to Gaver and Im, 
modern businesses hav e complex operations including customers, types of labor, laws, 
regulations, and capital markets, making it more difficult for shareholders to monitor firm 
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performance.  In addition, other modern business trends such as outsourcing services 
conducted in the hope of increasing shareholder value, understanding how these new 
trends affected the shareholders’ value is difficult (Gaver & Im, 2014).  Industrial 
diversification could benefit managers by providing them with more power through 
compensations (Cheng, Venezia, & Lou, 2013).  Agency costs have increased due to the 
increased cost and difficulty of monitoring executives from the home office (Cheng et al., 
2013).   
Rival Theories 
Over time, researchers have become all too aware of the limitations of agency 
theory, especially its narrow assumptions of human nature (Raelin & Bondy, 2013), 
stimulating a need of development and application for other theoretical lenses.  The link 
between executive compensation and firm performance does not receive much empirical 
support, and agency theory partly fails to distinguish other factors such as opportunists’ 
behavior, which could influence CEO’s actions (Raelin & Bondy, 2013).  Because of 
these shortcomings of agency theory in explaining the link between CEO’s pay and firm 
performance, other theories have emerged to supplement agency theory in explaining 
CEO’s compensation (Raelin & Bondy, 2013).  Some of these new theories include (a) 
portfolio theory, (b) resource dependency theory, and (c) prospect theory (Moore, 2014).  
Portfolio theory.  Portfolio theory assumes that rational and risk-averse 
executives will invest their wealth in a diversified portfolio rather than in the stock of the 
firm that put the executive’s wealth in one basket (Essid, 2012).  However, with stock 
options, awarding CEOs’ with only one company stock increases the CEOs’ portfolio 
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risk (Gomez & Wiseman, 2012).  This increase of CEO’s portfolio risk is contrary to the 
foundation of portfolio theory (Gomez & Wiseman, 2012).  On the other hand, resource 
dependency theory states that organizations are dependent on actors outside the 
organization because these actors provide uncertainties in meeting strategic performance 
goals (Cuevas et al., 2012).  According to Cuevas et al. (2012), these external factors, that 
the CEO cannot control, affected firm performance.  Therefore, consideration of external 
economic factors beyond executives control is important when structuring CEO’s stock 
options.   
Prospect theory.  Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed prospect theory.  
Prospect theory is widely viewed as the best description on how people explore the role 
of attitudes toward risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  Tversky and Kahneman advanced 
prospect theory as a critique to utility theory, which had dominated analysis of decision 
making under risk.  Tversky and Kahneman argued that decision making under risk was a 
choice between prospects or risks.  The term prospect refers to a set of probabilities 
where people overestimate outcomes that are certain, relative to outcomes that are 
probable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  In short, prospect theory predicts that 
individuals tend to be risk averse in a domain of gain, or when things are going well, and 
relatively risk seeking in a domain of losses, as when a leader is in the midst of a crisis 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  Agency theorists assume that equity ownership to CEO’s 
has a positive and direct effect on firm performance (Aaron, Harris, McDowell, & Cline, 
2014).  However, prospect theorists relax the assumptions of agency theory and apply a 
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behavioral approach (Yan & Liyan, 2013).  Therefore, while agency theory assumes that 
the manager is rational, prospect theory incorporates human behavior.  
While stock options are supposed to align, the CEO’s interests to the 
shareholders’ interests, under prospect theory, CEO’s perception of gain or loss is 
important.  According to Aaron et al. (2014), a CEO whose stock options are in the gain 
would adopt a defensive strategy designed to maintain current stock prices while a CEO 
in a loss position would adopt a risky strategy in an attempt to rescue options value.  In 
either gain or loss position, the interests of the shareholders and the CEO conflicts 
(Wasiuzzaman, Sahafzadeh, & Najad, 2015).  Per prospect theory, CEOs’ will be loss 
averse, responding much more strongly to being in a loss position than being in a gain or 
neutral position (Ryan et al., 2014).  According to Ryan et al. (2014), the short vesting 
period creates a mismatch between a firm’s long-term fundamental value and the 
executive’s speculation of the short-term stock performance.  This mismatch between 
long-term company fundamentals and executive stock options might lead to specific 
behaviors such as unnecessary spending and risk-taking to boost stock prices.  
Traditional microeconomic theories such as agency theory assume that agents 
facing alternatives evaluate all outcomes and could assess probabilities objectively before 
making decisions (Pirvu & Schulze, 2012).  The strength of prospect theory is that it 
deviates from agency theory and takes into account human behavior because human 
beings are not rational in decision-making.  In CEO’s decision-making, psychological 
factors such as overconfidence, conservatism, and fear of regret would override all 
rational decision choices (Alghalith, Floros, & Dukharan, 2012).  Prospect theory 
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incorporates real human decision-making patterns (Pirvu & Schulze, 2012).  Agency 
theory lacks in this regard, assuming instead that monitoring and offering CEOs’ 
incentives would align CEOs’ interests with shareholders’ interests.  Although agency 
theory is an essential framework, failure to find a link between firm performance and 
CEO’s compensation has stimulated the development of other theoretical lenses (Yan & 
Liyan, 2013).   
On the other hand, although prospect theory has helped explain human behavior 
when making decisions, it is still a new theory, and any new applications to dynamic 
contextual situations await further research (Yan & Liyan, 2013).  Extending prospect 
theory in several directions would encompass a wider range of decision problems (Daniel 
& Amos, 1979).  Other researchers have argued that assumptions used in behavioral 
finance models such as prospect theory do not seem to capture the behavior of financial 
professionals and require considerations (Alghalith et al., 2012; Zank, 2012).  Alghalith 
et al.’s (2012) study of financial professionals’ decision-making behavior found that loss 
aversion, which plays a crucial role in prospect theory, was not as important as typically 
assumed.  Alghalith et al. analyzed daily returns on the S&P500 from 2000 to 2010 to 
compute gain and explain investors’ behavior, and found that investors were risk seeking 
in the face of both losses and gains, contradicting prospect theory, which proposes that in 
a winning situation, investors will avoid risk.  Contrary to prospect theory, CEOs’ with 
stock options that are increasing in value could still make risky decisions on behalf of 
their companies.  
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Executive Compensation  
Executive compensation is one of the most debated topics in corporate 
governance literature (Rashid, 2013).  Annual changes to CEO’s compensation do not 
reflect the changes in corporate performance (Hannes & Tabbach, 2013).  To monitor 
CEO’s pay, SEC (2013) requires that all public companies disclose compensation paid to 
CEOs’, CFOs’, and certain other high-ranking executives.  According to the SEC, the 
Summary of Compensation table is the cornerstone of required disclosure on executive 
pay.  In addition, the SEC requires public companies to submit a proxy statement and a 
compensation table (See Appendix A), disclosing, base salary, bonus, stock awards, 
option awards, non-equity incentive compensation, change in pension value, and other 
compensation.  According to Compensation Summary table for Pfizer as of 2014, the 
CEO received over 18 million in stock options between 2012 and 2014 (See Appendix 
B).   
Executive compensation structure.  CEO’s compensation consists of some or 
combination of  fixed short-term pay in the form of salary and benefits, fixed long-term 
payment in the form of pension, variable short-term pay in the form of annual bonuses, 
and variable long-term pay in the form of deferred bonuses and long-term ion incentive 
awards (Oberholzers & Theusissen, 2012).  However, other than the base salary, the 
various components of CEO’s pay are difficult to calculate with certainty.  According to 
Economic Institute policy (2014), CEOs’ pay tends to fluctuate in tandem with the stock 
market confirming that CEOs’ tend to cash in their options when stock prices are high.  
The financial crisis in 2008 and the accompanying stock market tumble knocked CEOs’ 
25 
 
compensation by 44% by 2009, but not surprisingly by 2013, CEOs’ compensation had 
risen by 21.7% (Economic Policy Institute, 2014).  In addition, Srivastava (2013), noted 
that in 1999, CEOs’ pay including salary and other incentive payments averaged $2.3 
million, but a change in CEOs’ wealth resulting from holding the stocks awards and 
options paid to them averaged approximately $24.2 million.  Therefore, although fixed 
components of the CEOs’ compensation have reduced, variable components such as 
stock options have increased, in the alignment CEOs’ compensation with the 
shareholders.      
The structure of executive pay is meant to align the CEO’s pay with the strategic 
plan of the corporation (Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, & Thakor, 2014).  The board of 
directors is supposed to structure optimal compensation contract in which salaries, 
bonuses, stock, and stock options grants provide significant rewards for superior 
performance (Baum, Ford, & Zhao, 2012).  Shareholders should set CEO’s compensation 
through arm’s length contracting between executives attempting to get the best deal for 
themselves and boards trying to get the best deal for shareholders (Gopalan et al., 2014).  
Therefore, CEO’s compensation package should not only align the actions of the CEO’s 
with the firm’s performance, but also ensure that the total compensation package attracts 
and retains good talent (Moore, 2014).  For firms to maintain competitiveness and 
improve shareholders value, attracting, and retaining good managers through a 
competitive compensation package is important.     
Measurements of executive compensation.  Researchers who have studied 
CEO’s compensation and firm performance have investigated various dependent 
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variables related to CEO’s compensation; including stock compensation (Sun, Wei, & 
Huang, 2013) and CEO’s total compensation (Gong, 2011).  Akinloye (2012) examined 
the relationship between executive stocks and the earnings performance of firms and 
found a correlation between executive stock options to the alternative earnings measure.  
Akinloye found that using $1 executive stock options to remunerate top executives 
increased corporate earnings by $1.92.  However, Akinloye noted that although 
performance increased with executive stock options, such increases occurred at a 
diminishing rate, revealing an adverse relationship between firm earnings and high stock 
options levels.  Sheikh (2012) found a positive relationship between stock options 
awarded to investments in R&D expenditures and number of patents.  Oberholzers and 
Theusissen (2012) argued that there are concerns that CEOs’ reaped the benefits of an 
increased share price, although the increased in stock price was probably due to market 
factors and not much to CEOs’ performance.  It is therefore possible that a firm CEO 
could receive stock options awards not because of effort but favorable external factors 
beyond the manager’s control.    
Sun et al. (2013) analyzed revenue and cost efficiency to understand the 
relationship between top executive compensation and firm performance.  Sun et al. found 
that revenue efficiency had a significant relationship with cash compensation to CEO’s, 
but no relationship to stock options incentives.  On cost efficiency, Sun et al. found a 
positive relationship with stock options.  Edmonds et al. (2012) sampled 1,456 firms from 
1998 to 2009, focusing on CEO’s bonus compensation and found that missing revenues 
forecast negatively affected CEO’s cash bonus.  Edmonds et al. also noted that CEOs’ 
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from growth companies experienced severe reductions in their cash bonus payments 
because of missing earnings forecasts, as compared to CEOs’ from value firms.  
Edmonds et al. concluded that compensation committees relied on information conveyed 
in revenues estimates when contracting with the CEOs’ on the compensation package. 
Riachi and Schwienbacher (2013) compared the sensitivity of managerial cash 
incentives to firm performance on firms listed on the Hong Kong stock listing.  Riachi 
and Schwienbacher defined measured performance using ROA and stock performance.  
To control other factors that could affect performance, Riachi and Schwienbacher did not 
include utility companies because performance sensitivity is weaker for regulated firms.  
Riachi and Schwienbacher found that there was a significant relationship between CEO’s 
cash pay and ROA, but there was an insignificant relationship between CEO’s cash pay 
and stock performance.  However, stocks performance is long-term oriented, while cash 
payments are short-term oriented, which could explain the insignificant relationship 
between cash pay and ROA.     
Gong and Li (2012) sampled 1,039 CEOs’ whose compensation tenure began in 
1992 and ended in 2007 and found that increasing CEO’s compensation increased 
shareholder value.  Gong and Li found that a 1% increase in nominal CEO’s pay lead to a 
1.86% increase in shareholder value.  Wang et al. (2013) studied 2,448 CEOs’ from 
1,622 firms spanning a range extending from 1997 through 2002 and noted that 
companies that highly paid their CEOs’, had a greater degree of international 
diversification, higher accounting earnings performance, large firm size, and large 
investment opportunities.  Wang et al. also noted that the greater the degree of industrial 
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diversification, the fewer levels of total compensation and stock options received.  Wang 
et al. concluded that as firms expanded beyond national borders to remain competitive, 
managers are motivated to increase shareholders value.  On the other hand, industrial 
diversification increases business segments, bringing in complexity and difficult to 
monitor managers (Wang et al., 2013).  It is therefore possible that many business 
segments might be difficult for shareholders to monitor and could cause agency 
problems.  
Power of the chief executive officer.  The scope of the CEO’s power in public 
corporations is vast.  Agency theorists proposed that due to conflicts of interests between 
outside shareholders and managers, the board of directors has the fundamental role of 
monitoring managers to ensure that managers act in the best interest of shareholders.  To 
ensure that the CEO does not influence the board, the NYSE requires that the three 
principal board committees (audit, compensation, and nominating) of listed companies be 
composed solely of independent directors (NYSE, 2014).  The main purpose of these 
committees is monitoring for the shareholders and advising the management to reduce 
agency conflicts.   
According to Lin and Lin (2014), CEO’s may influence the board of directors, 
thereby compromising the independence of the board.  Lin and Lin examined 713 firms 
between 2007 and 2010 to analyze how the CEO influenced the compensation process for 
the CEO’s own gain.  Because the compensation for directors and CEOs’ should reflect 
the performance of firms, Lin and Lin used ROA and ROE.  Lin and Lin stated that CEO 
could influence the board, hoping to change their stock options and compensation not 
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commensurate with firm performance.  The researchers found that CEO’s received higher 
pay when the directors’ compensation was high, supporting the mutual back-scratching 
relationship between the CEO and the board of directors’ (Lin & Lin, 2014).  Lin and Lin 
also found that short-tenured directors had less ability to influence the board of directors’ 
and CEO’s with a lengthy tenure were likely to influence directors’ selection process, 
causing agency problems.  In addition, Lin and Lin found that ROE was a better predictor 
of directors’ compensation than ROA because ROE reflected how well a firm performed 
from the shareholders’ point of view.   
Sun and Cahan (2012) studied 1,255 companies to examine the influence of a 
compensation committee on CEO’s pay.  The compensation committee is responsible for 
setting up the payment structure of the CEO.  Sun and Cahan found a negative 
association between the quality of a compensation committee to higher CEO’s influence 
and CEO’s tenure.  Cheikh (2014) defined three indicators of CEO’s power: (a) CEO as 
chairman of the board, (b) CEO associated with being the founder of the firm, and (c) 
CEO as the only inside director on the board.  Cheikh found that in firms where CEOs’ 
had power, the CEOs’ had no constraints on taking risks when making decisions.  
Additionally, Cheikh found that large enterprises had agency and centralization problems 
while, in small businesses, CEOs’ were authoritarian, entrenched, and made risky 
decisions.  Cheikh recommended the presence of external independent directors with 
expertise as best positioned to monitor CEOs’ actions and reduce agency costs.   
Bahloul, Hachicha, and Bouri (2013) focused on measuring CEOs’ performance 
using value creation rather than using traditional metrics such as ROA and ROE.  Bahloul 
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et al. studied 125 European insurance firms between 2002 and 2008 to measure how the 
power of CEO affected performance of the firms.  Bahloul et al. found that in markets 
where the CEOs’ had less power, these companies had improvements in cost efficiencies 
and improved productivity.  Bahloul et al. also concluded that market discipline and 
directors’ decisions could improve management in terms of effectiveness.  Therefore, 
CEO’s power could influence growth of productivity, enabling the firm to be more 
productive and efficient, thereby increasing shareholders value and reducing agency 
costs.  
Jha, Kobelsky, and Lim (2013) sampled 3,654 CEOs’ and found a negative 
association between high levels of stock options incentives and reporting material 
weaknesses.  Jha et al. concluded this negative association occurred because CEOs’ and 
CFOs’ were more likely to override internal controls to manipulate firm performance.  
According to Jha et al., these findings had significant implications for boards of directors, 
managers, and regulators when structuring or analyzing executive pay.  Individual firms’ 
boards of directors may want to consider whether long-term and short-term incentives are 
enough to weaken controls in order to manipulate performance (Jha et al., 2013).  In 
addition, compensation committees should consider how high levels of executive stock 
options might influence the alignment of CEOs’ interests with the shareholders.  
 Huang, Haung, and Li’s (2011) case study on GOME Inc. revealed how the CEO 
and board of directors fought for power, causing agency problems.  GOME Inc. was one 
of the largest appliance retailers in China, listed on the Hong Kong Exchange (Huang et 
al., 2011).  According to Huang et al., fighting for control at GOME started after the 
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arrest of the founder, Haung Guangyu, and Xiao Chen became the CEO and chairman of 
the board of directors.  Chen, then the CEO and chairman of the board at GOME, 
engaged in activities that clearly showed how the CEOs’ could cause agency problems.  
In 2009, Chen launched an incentive program with 383 million shares; approximately 3% 
of common stock outstanding, with Chen awarded 125.5 million shares (Huang et al., 
2011).  Chen also offered favorable debt covenants to Bain Capital to purchase 
convertible debt in 2009, enabling Bain Capital in 2010 to convert this debt into 16.31 
million shares, thereby becoming the second largest shareholder of GOME with 9.8% of 
total shares outstanding.  In this case, executives caused agency problems by awarding 
themselves generous stock options and offering favorable debt covenants to Bain capital, 
enabling Bain capital to become one GOMEs largest shareholders.  
Another area in which CEOs’ could use their power to influence firm 
performance is in the capital structure of the firm.  Jiraporn, Chintrkarn, and Liu (2011) 
sampled 1,264 firms from 1992 to 2004 analyzed the impact of CEO’s dominance in the 
capital structure of the firm.  To measure CEO’s dominance, Jiraporn et al. considered 
CEO’s pay slice (CPS).  CPS is the fraction of the aggregate top-five compensation 
captured by the CEO.  Jiraporn et al. asserted that CPS was a better indicator of CEO’s 
power because CPS is a continuous variable that captures subtle gradation of CEO’s 
duality.  The researchers noted that one way the CEOs’ influenced capital structure was 
through suboptimal leverage (Jiraporn et al., 2011).  In addition, Jiraporn et al. noted that 
dominant CEOs’ tended to adopt lower leverage, probably to evade the disciplinary 
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mechanisms associated with debt financing.  Therefore, choosing a suboptimal capital 
structure could negatively affect firms’ performance, reducing shareholders value.  
 Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2012) also used CPS to understand the 
relationship between the CEOs’ and the other members of the top executive team, as well 
as the relationship between this measure and performance of the firm.  According to 
Bebchuk et al., CPS represented a rich set of relations with a broad range of aspects of 
the performance and behavior of firms.  Using 3,256 CEOs data between 1993 and 2004, 
Bebchuk et al. found that the average CPS was 35%, and its standard deviation was 
11.4%.  Bebchuk et al. found that firms with high CPS had less CEO’s turnover from 
poor performance, were less profitable, and had a more opportunistic timing of CEO’s 
option grants.  In addition, firms with high CEO’s CPS had greater entrenchment, 
explaining the lower turnover of CEO’s, even after poor performance—an apparent 
source of an agency problem. 
Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) examined how CEO’s compensation incentives 
affected corporate cash holdings, causing agency conflicts, and found that there was a 
positive relationship between CEO’s compensation and cash holdings.  Using 
compensation data from ExecuComp, Liu et al. looked at 20,349 firm-years over the 
period from 1992 to 2006.  According to Liu et al., CEOs’ with volatile compensation 
from incentives adopted to holding large cash balances to moderately high cost of debt.  
Holding large cash balances is, therefore, likely to act as a hedge to the firm.  Liu et al. 
suggested that CEO’s risk-taking incentives encourage greater liquidity because CEOs’ 
prefer holding large cash balances than taking risks, which might benefit shareholders.  
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Therefore, understanding CEOs’ holding preference of either debt or cash is important to 
understanding how it affects firm performance and the shareholders’ value.  
CEOs’ with higher incentives are likely to enter into liquidity covenants with 
creditors because creditors anticipate more risk-taking behavior by the CEO (Abels & 
Martelli, 2013).  However, intense monitoring destroys the trust necessary for the CEO to 
share relevant strategic information with directors (Abels & Martelli, 2013).  Abels and 
Martelli (2013) sampled 2,051 firms from 1998 to 2006 and studied CEO’s turnover, 
CEO’s compensation, and earning quality of firms.  Abels and Martelli found that 
companies in which directors served on several committees devoted more to oversight 
than to providing top-level strategic counsel.  In addition, according to Abels and 
Martelli, companies with more monitoring had lower earning quality and the CEOs’ had 
excess compensation because of the anticipated CEO’s turnover.   
Agency theory suggests that CEO’s duality, the practice of one person serving as 
both CEO and board chair of the firm, is unsuitable for firm performance because it 
compromises the monitoring, and control of the CEO.  CEO’s duality reflects lower 
board oversight and stronger CEO’s power, while non-duality reflects higher board 
oversight and weaker CEO power (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013; Moscu, 2013).  
Moscu (2013) examined the link between CEO’s duality and performance (ROA and 
ROE) by analyzing 62 firms listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange.  Moscu’s regression 
model included ROA and ROE as the dependent variables and duality, firm size, debt to 
equity, and CEO’s shares ownership as the dependent variables.  Moscu observed that 
duality and the ROA regression coefficient were positive but not significant.  In addition, 
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in firms with duality with the CEO holding significant equity holding, a regression 
coefficient showed that this combination negatively affected performance.  However, 
Dogan, Elitas, Agca, and Ogel (2013) analyzed 204 companies listed on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2010.  Dogan et al. noted that firms with duality had 
lower ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s q (the proportion of market value to book value) 
compared to firms with a separate CEO and chair.  These results were in accordance with 
agency theory on the benefits of reducing CEO’s power to improve monitoring and 
reduce agency costs.   
 Other studies have addressed how CEO’s tenure affected firm performance 
(McClelland, Barker, & Oh, 2012; Moore, 2014).  Moore (2014) investigated whether 
there is a relationship between the CEO’s tenure and compensation levels in the U.S. 
healthcare industry.  Tenure was the number of consecutive days a CEO had held that 
position.  Moore noted that CEO’s tenure might lead to entrenchment of the CEO within 
a firm and afford the CEO the ability to influence compensation.  Moore suggested that 
compensation committees should consider CEO’s tenure and firm size as playing a 
significant role in determining CEO’s compensation.  According to Moore, firm size and 
CEO’s tenure could override use of firm performance parameters in determining CEO 
pay. 
McClelland et al. (2012) reviewed data on for 220 companies from Standard & 
Poor’s to examine how CEO’s age and CEO’s tenure related firm performance.  
McClelland et al. stated that young CEOs’ were more likely than older CEOs’ to adopt 
risky strategies to enhance business value.  CEOs’ with shorter career horizons were 
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more likely to adopt strategic postures that are risk averse and more conducive to job 
security, while older CEOs’ would avoid strategies that would pay off after their 
retirements.  The dependent variables were ROA and Tobin’s q (market to book value).  
Independent variables were CEO’s age and CEO’s tenure, and two moderating variables 
were CEO’s ownership and industry dynamism.  McClelland et al. concluded that CEO’s 
with short tenures led to lower future financial performance, while CEOs’ with lengthier 
tenure generated lower financial performance in dynamic industries, but not in stable 
industries.  McClelland et al. also noted that there was a lower ROA, on average, when 
older CEOs’ held high ownership positions in their firms.  These results indicated that 
equity ownership, although advocated by agency theorists as aligning CEOs’ interests 
with the shareholders’ interests, had mixed effects on firm performance depending on 
CEO’s horizon and CEO’s tenure.   
Pharmaceutical Industry Executive Compensation 
 Few studies have examined the use of stock options compensation to CEOs’ in 
the pharmaceutical industry, although the use of incentives in the pharmaceutical industry 
is important to motivate research and, in the process, improve stock prices.  The design of 
equity incentives such as stock options grants amplifies the value of the executive after 
FDA approval to unpredictable levels (Brown, 2013).  Because a majority of prior 
compensation research has aggregated industries into a single omnibus sample, it has 
been difficult to detect compensation effects that are likely industry specific (Offstein & 
Gnyawali, 2005).  
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The pharmaceutical industry is also unusual because of the larger number of 
companies with small revenues, significant losses in net income, but high market value 
(Schmutz & Santerre, 2013).  CEOs’ of these companies receive compensating even 
when the performance of their firms is not observable (Schmutz & Santerre, 2013).  
Schmutz and Santerre (2013) explained many of these small pharmaceutical companies 
with negligible revenues but with large market values, and large budgets were likely 
developing a new pharmaceutical product that has not yet reached the market.  It is 
therefore likely that investors estimate the company’s valuation based on future earning 
potential of these pharmaceutical companies.   
Pharmaceutical company proxy statement shows the intense pressure to develop 
drugs and get them approved by the FDA (Brown, 2013).  Brown (2013) stated that 
residents of the United States spent $307 billion on pharmaceuticals in 2010; but to 
access this market, pharmaceutical companies need to generate research that leads to 
FDA approval and then sell these products to these markets.  According to Brown, the 
major pharmaceutical companies have similar compensation formulas for their top 
executives, with a fixed component making only 20% of the total award and equity 
incentives components representing most of the compensation.  New drugs working their 
way through the FDA approval process and vesting of stock options makes compensation 
of CEOs’ in the pharmaceutical industry difficult to predict.  However, vesting is 
important by ensuring that the CEOs’ earns the stock options over time, ensuring 
management continuity during product development (Essid, 2012).  
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Roach (2003) reviewed data from 184 public pharmaceutical companies with 
revenues ranging from $100,000 to $47 billion.  The companies selected also had market 
values ranging from $8 million to $285 billion.  To calculate the market value of stock 
options, Roach used the Black-Scholes model.  All of the stock options awarded had a 
10-year life, 4-year vesting schedule, and were not transferable.  In using the Black-
Shores model, Roach applied a 5% risk-free interest as the 10-year Treasury bond, and 
volatilities of 144, which was the average volatility reported by the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange for 2001.  Roach stated that the results showed no relationship between CEO’s 
compensation and company performance, but the use of stock options represented more 
than 51% of the CEO’s pay.  Roach also noted a positive relationship between CEO’s 
wealth, CEO’s tenure, and increased company market value.  Roach concluded that 
CEO’s wealth increased because the CEOs’ had a long tenure and held substantial stock 
holdings in the enterprise.   
Offstein and Gnyawali (2005) examined how the use of CEOs’ incentives in the 
pharmaceutical industry affected firm competitive behavior by using data on CEOs’ 
short- and long-term incentives from 1998 to 2000.  Offstein and Gnyawali’s considered 
SEC requirement that only firms with more than $10 million in revenues should report 
executive compensation.  Offstein and Gnyawali’s study sample included only 48 major 
publicly traded companies in the U.S.  To gauge competitive actions, Offstein and 
Gnyawali used data from the FACTIVA database to code competitive activities and 
included launching of a new product and acquiring intellectual property rights.  Firm size 
and firm performance were the control variables when measuring CEOs’ incentives 
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because these components influenced both compensation and competition.  Independent 
variables were the number of employees, CEO’s bonus, and CEO’s long-term incentives.  
Offstein and Gnyawali (2005) noted a positive relationship between CEOs’ long-term 
incentives compensation while the use of short-term incentives such as bonuses were not 
significant.  The lengthy nature of the R&D process in high-tech firms such as those in 
the pharmaceutical industry is fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty (Offstein & 
Gnyawali, 2005).  In addition, Offstein and Gnyawali’s study results indicated the 
importance of firm size and firm performance in depicting competitive activity, with the 
two variables explaining at least 76% of the variance in CEO’s compensation.   
Stock Options 
Stock options are contracts that give the owner the right to buy a share at a pre-
specified price, the exercise price, for a pre-specified period of a term called vesting.  The 
holder of the option hopes to use the option when the company stock is higher than the 
exercise price (Baker et al., 2013).  Many firms utilize both incentive stock options and 
nonqualified stock options as equity compensation for executives (Sigler, 2011).  
Nonqualified options have a disadvantage in that taxable income will be reported when 
options are exercised, whether the stock is sold or not.  Moreover, income from 
nonqualified options is taxed as ordinary income (Internal Revenue Service [IRS], 2014).  
However, qualified stock options avoid this disadvantage because there is no income to 
report at the time they are exercised unless the stock is sold at the same time the purchase 
option is exercised and the stock qualifies for long-term capital gains if held for one year 
(Sigler, 2011).  According to the IRS, the maximum capital gains tax, which is the price 
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appreciation above the exercise price, is 20% (IRS, 2014).  Therefore, the lower tax rate 
and the ability to defer tax payments to the future makes qualified stock options attractive 
as part of CEOs’ compensation package (Baker et al., 2013). 
History on stock options.  While research on executive compensation has 
appeared in academic literature since the beginning of the 20th century, it was not until 
the 1950s that literature on stock options started appearing (Jones & Smith, 2012; 
Murphy & Trefftzs, 2012).  Murphy and Trefftzs (2012) noted that there were no tax 
codes on stock options during the 1920s.  Frydman and Saks (2010) stated that before the 
Great Depression, small businesses run by family members dominated corporate structure 
in America.  Changes in American corporate structure started happening between 1895 
and 1904, when nearly 2,000 small manufacturing businesses combined to form 157 large 
corporations, and shifted management of these small businesses from the owners to 
professional executives (Murphy & Trefftzs, 2012).  Shifting of business management 
from the owners to professional managers brought about agency problems, necessitating 
the need for alignment of interests between the owner and the managers (Murphy & 
Trefftzs, 2012) 
Although disclosure of executive pay to the public became compulsory in 1934 
after the highly publicized stockholder disputes about bonuses paid to executives at 
Bethlehem Steel, American Tobacco, and National City Bank (Spector & Spital, 2011), 
interest in stock options started after the Revenue Act of 1950 (Frydman & Saks, 2010; 
Murphy & Trefftzs, 2012).  Murphy and Trefftzs (2012) stated that by the 1950s, stock 
options had become a serious issue because of the highest marginal tax rate on ordinary 
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and corporate incomes had swelled to 91% and 41%, respectively, while capital gains had 
remained at 25%.  The most important advantage of the Revenue Act of 1950 was that it 
recommended that stock options should be taxed as capital gains at no more than 25% 
(Schneider, 1951).  With a flat and favorable 25% tax rate, use of stock options by U.S. 
corporations listed on NYSE increased from 4% in 1950 to 12% by June 1951 (Murphy 
& Trefftzs, 2012).  Frydman and Saks (2010) studied the 50 largest firms between 1940 
and 1960 and estimated that the fraction of executive stock options increased from less 
than 10% of total compensation in the 1950s to over 20% in the 1960s.  Therefore, 
according to Frydman and Saks, executive compensation changed considerably in the 
1970s, as both stock options and other forms of incentive pay became larger components 
of total CEOs’ compensation.  
Legal and regulatory framework.  Stock options are subject to tax, securities 
laws, and accounting standards.  Securities laws that affect stock options are the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which Congress passed 
in the hope of restoring investors’ confidence after the stock market crash of 1929 (Baker 
et al., 2013).  The Securities Act of 1934 gives the SEC the authority to set accounting 
standards, but the SEC has delegated this authority to the Financial Accounting and 
Standards Board (FASB).  The most notable standard on stock options created by the 
FASB is FAS 123(R), revised in 2004 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB], 
2014).  The aim of FAS 123(R) is to help users of financial statements understand the 
effect that equity compensations have on the financial condition of entities (FASB, 2014).  
FAS 123(R) requires that all entities recognize an expense for share-based systems using 
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a fair value method on the grant date and the cost recognized over the vesting period 
(FASB, 2014). 
Adoption of stock options.  Agency theorists recognize that there is a divergence 
of interest between the shareholders and managers.  According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), if both the principal and agent are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal.  Jensen and 
Meckling recommended establishing appropriate incentives for the agent to reduce 
divergence of interests.  One of the greatest challenges in organizations is that principals 
are often not privy to what agents are doing (Martin, Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 2012).  
To reduce this agency conflict between shareholders and the CEOs’, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) recommended either monitoring or incentive alignment.  However, 
monitoring CEO’s behavior is challenging and instead of encouraging risk aversion, 
aligning the risk preferences by awarding equity-based incentives will discourage CEO’s 
risk aversion (Gerard, 2014).    
Monitoring is effective in block ownership, where stock ownership is 
concentrated among a few shareholders.  Several studies have shown that when equity 
ownership of a firm is concentrated in institutional ownership, there is effective 
governance; the role to monitor and influence positive decisions of the firm is made by 
the leader/owners and there is no obvious need for executive incentive plans (Essid, 
2012; Mitra, Hossain, & Marks, 2012; Murphy & Trefftzs, 2012).  However, when a firm 
has many shareholders, equity ownership is widely dispersed among many shareholders, 
and alignment of agent and principal interests using incentives is necessary (Essid, 2012).   
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In widely dispersed companies where managers have a substantial level of 
discretion, there is a need for monitoring and the board of directors is the internal control 
mechanism that protects the interests of shareholders (Álvarez-Pérez & Neira-Fontela, 
2013).  One way in which boards of directors address the agency problem is to link 
executive pay to the wealth of the firm by offering equity ownership to managers (Sigler, 
2003).  Therefore, firms award stock options to attract, retain, and motivate executives by 
tying personal fortunes of senior executives to measures of performance of the firm (Wu, 
Liao, & Huang, 2013).   
Some researchers have questioned the efficacy of CEOs’ stock options as 
compensation in reducing agency costs (Akinloye & Hussein, 2012; Murphy & Trefftzs, 
2012) and other researchers have questioned the effectiveness of board of directors in 
monitoring CEOs’ to reduce agency costs (Lin & Lin, 2014).  Murphy and Trefftzs 
analyzed data on CEOs’ from 14 countries and found that U.S. CEOs’ earned 
substantially more than foreign CEOs’ and a significant portion of US CEOs’ 
compensation was stock options.  According to Murphy and Trefftzs (2012), the 
increased reliance on options helped fuel the accounting and backdating scandals in the 
early 2000s.  Sheikh (2012) argued that stock options reduce agency problems because 
the managers’ wealth is linked to performance of the firm.  In addition, Sheikh stated that 
use of stock options influenced agents’ risk preference, but current options awards were 
effective in encouraging innovation than incentives from previous awards.  It is therefore 
possible that executives are motivated to innovate hoping to increase current options 
awards value.   
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Dicks (2012) stated that reducing agency theory using incentives is not enough 
because CEOs’ behavior could be influenced by other factors such as firm risk.  
Deviation of managers’ behavior from the traditional paradigm of rational agents shows 
that incentives are not enough to align managers’ behavior with shareholders (Gerard, 
2014).  Paz and Griffin (2014) noted that use of stock options eliminated the ex-post 
settling problem.  The ex-post problem arises when managers are paid in cash for 
expected future cash flows that do not materialize (Tangjitprom, 2013).  Tangjitprom 
(2013) concluded that by not rewarding CEOs’ with cash but with using stock options, 
shareholders would not lose value if unrealized gains did not happen.  Therefore, 
according to Tangjitprom, unlike cash that is immediate compensation, stock options are 
preferred because the CEOs’ only benefits when the stock price increases above the strike 
price.      
Khalid and Rehman (2014) found a positive relationship between executive 
incentives and shareholders’ wealth.  However, although use of stock options has been 
subject to extensive prior research in highlighting its incentive role, it was only after the 
corporate scandals in the 2000s that interest in the inefficiency of this type of 
compensation started appearing.  The corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other 
companies demonstrated the inability of stock option incentives (Bozec & Dia, 2015; 
Hall & Kelvin, 2003).  Hall and Kelvin (2003) noted that during the 1990s, the average 
pay for CEOs’ of S&P 500 grew from $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million in 2000, and 
most of this salary increase was because of a fixation on stock options grants, which grew 
nine-fold, averaging at approximately $800,000 in 1992 to $7.2 million in 2000.  
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However, it is not clear whether the increased use of stock options as part of CEOs’ 
compensation correlates with increased shareholders value.  
Jouber and Fakhfakh (2012) argued CEOs’ salary as positively related to outside 
contingencies as well as shareholders’ interests and noted that management takes 
advantage of external events, misleading investors of their skills and efforts.  Jouber and 
Fakhfakh recommended that shareholders should be aware of the effects that 
macroeconomic factors could have on promoting CEOs’ ability and include this caveat 
when designing CEOs’ pay contracts.  Benke (2014) noted that since the early 2000s, 
stock options had been a cause of unethical behavior as CEOs’ engaged in earnings 
management.  Benke stated that many executives participate in earnings management, 
hoping to beat analysts’ forecasts and boost their stock options prices.  Therefore, 
although stock awards mitigate agency problems between shareholders and self-
interested managers, external factors beyond managers’ control might affect this 
objective.    
Firm Performance 
 With the separation of ownership from management, the discovery of an 
appropriate criterion has become increasingly important for evaluating the performance 
of managers and companies.  Various independent variables have merits in measuring 
firm performance as it relates to CEO’s compensation.  Sigler (2003) stated CEOs’ pay as 
related to three independent variables: CEO’s tenure, ROE, and revenues, while Alrafadi 
and Md-Yusuf (2014) stated that ROI is a financial ratio commonly used to evaluate the 
overall performance of a company.  Nakhaei (2012) stated firm performance as into two 
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categories: accounting measures and economic performance models.  In the accounting 
performance evaluation model, the value of a business functions as parameters such as 
ROE, ROI, annual revenues, net profit, earnings per share, free cash flow, and dividends 
(Stewart, 1991).  In the economic measure, firm value is a function power of potential 
investors, and the difference between rate of return and weighted average cost of capital-
WACC.  According to Nakhaeu, examining performance measures is important to help 
shareholders and managers in decision-making and understanding managers’ 
performance.  
Return on equity (ROE).   Among all traditional measures, ROE is a common 
and relatively good performance measure and perhaps the most widely used overall 
measure of corporate financial performance (Nandi, 2012).  ROE is an accounting-based 
measurement of the income of a firm divided by the total company equity.  Using ROE as 
a measure of accounting performance for a given company is appropriate because it is the 
same information that shareholders receive from the firm (Banker, Darrough, Huang, & 
Plehn, 2013; Sigler, 2011).  ROE represents the result of a structured financial ratio 
analysis called Du Pont and contributes to its popularity among analysts, financial 
managers, and shareholders (Nakhaei, 2012).  In addition, ROE has a significant 
relationship to stock return and firm performance (Nakhaei, 2012). 
To understand the relationship between CEOs’ compensation and ROE, Sigler 
(2011) examined the performance of 280 firms listed on the NYSE for the period of 2006 
to 2009.  The period of 2006 to 2009 was significant because it was after the adoption of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; an Act necessitated by corporate failures.  To test the 
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relationship between CEO’s pay and company performance, Sigler used a model that 
included company Beta, CEO’s tenure, and ROE as the independent variable and CEO’s 
pay as the dependent variable.  Sigler’s regression results revealed that ROE had a 
positive and significant coefficient with CEO’s pay.  Results also showed that size of the 
firm and tenure of the CEO had the most impact on the CEO’s compensation.  Sigler 
concluded that size of the firm affected pay because a larger company required special 
skills not available to many managers while tenure implied that the CEO has acquired 
more knowledge and expertise over time in the CEO’s position.   
Nakhaei (2012) examined which firm performance measurements were better in 
predicting business returns.  In the study, Nakhaei reviewed the capabilities of economic 
measures such as value-added metrics to accounting measures of ROE and return on 
assets (ROA).  In the study, stock performance was the dependent variable while 
accounting and economic measures were the independent variables.  Nakhaei examined 
listed Malaysia firms over the period 2001 – 2010 and concluded that ROE was superior 
because it could be broken into three separate ratios of (a) profitability, (b) asset turnover, 
and (c) increased financial leverage, all which affected shareholders value.  Nakhaei 
posited that although an increase in financial leverage could improve ROE, this could not 
be beneficial to shareholders as the firm incurred more debt.   
 Specifically, the past ROE and RET are both positively and significantly 
associated CEOs’ compensation (Banker et al., 2013).  Banker et al. (2013) examined the 
relationship between current compensation and past performance as a measure of CEOs’ 
ability and sampled 2,498 firms between 1993 and 2006.  ROE was the primary 
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performance measure, and stock returns (RET) were a forward measure.  Banker et al. 
posited that past performance was relevant in CEOs’ pay because it reflected ability.  The 
model examined whether past business performance influenced salary, cash, bonus, or 
equity paid to the CEO of the firm.   
Banker et al. (2013) found that CEOs’ compensation was 70% more sensitive to 
past ROE or RET than to contemporaneous ROE or RET.  When past performance was 
high, the principal could provide a continuing agent with a higher salary (Banker et al., 
2013).  Banker et al. also recommended that focusing on total CEOs’ compensation 
instead of analyzing compensation components individually did not reveal any significant 
relationship with the past performance of a firm.  In addition, Banker et al. noted that 
there was a positive association between CEOs’ pay and past performance. Banker et al. 
concluded that association between compensation components, current and past 
performance is partly attributable to the CEOs’ ability.  Therefore, when analyzing 
CEOs’ compensation, analyzing past CEO’s ability might offer more oversight into the 
CEOs’ compensation structure.   
Return on investment (ROI).  According to Alrafadi and Md-Yusuf (2014) to 
determine firm performance, ROI is commonly used.  Alrafadi and Md-Yusuf stated that 
there are three dominant reasons for using ROI: First people easily understand ROI 
easily.  Second, it combines three critical performance measures variables; scale, 
earnings, and investments.  Third, it is popular with financial analysis, investors, 
creditors, and other external information users.   
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Scholars have measured ROI differently depending on whether it was a forward 
looking or back looking measure of performance.  Eklund and Palmberg (2013) measured 
ROI as marginal return on investment over the firms cost of capital.  Eklund and 
Palmberg used the net present value (NPV) rule for investments.  The NPV rule for 
investments’ holds that managers should invest until NPV of additional investments’ is 
zero.  NPV rule shows whether the firm is over or under-invested relative to its cost of 
capital (Alrafadi & Md-Yusuf, 2014).  Sanz and Nicol (2014) measured ROI as the 
average return on invested capital over a performance measure period.  Sanz and Nicol 
measured ROI using pre-tax income divided by invested capital (total debt and total 
equity).  Paz (2012) stated that the difference between these two measures is that NPV is 
forward looking while average return on invested capital is backward looking.  NPV is 
used to decide between projects to further evaluate future earnings (Paz, 2012).  Tang 
(2013) stated that return on invested capital is a backward looking measure indicator that 
measures efficiency of company capital inputs.  However, in this study, based on time 
constraints and the complexity of using NPV method, I used return on invested capital 
method.  
Revenue.   Revenue is one of the most important measures used by investors in 
assessing the performance and prospects of a company (FASB, 2014).  To understand the 
importance of revenue to firms, on May 28, 2014, the FASB, and international 
accounting standards boards has jointly issued new requirements for revenue recognition 
by firms.  FASB stated that the new standards would be significant achievements in 
improving financial reporting (FASB, 2014).  Revenues apply to all firms, and revenue 
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recognition is a common type of restatement (Peterson, 2011).  It is therefore not 
surprising that various studies have looked at how revenues affected CEOs’ pay 
(Arbogast & Mirabella, 2014; Pandher & Currie, 2013).   
Arbogast and Mirabella (2014) analyzed the relationship between CEO’s age, 
education, and tenure to the performance of the company in relation to its percentage 
change in revenues per year by sampling 2011 Fortune 500 firms from 1995 to 2010.  
The dependent variables were percent change in revenues and the independent variables 
were CEO’s education, tenure, age, and percent change of S&P.  Tracking the CEO’s 
performance against the S&P mitigated for market fluctuations.  Arbogast and Mirabella 
noted that age had a negative impact on the change in revenues of firms.  In addition, 
Arbogast and Mirabella noted that older CEOs’ had lower returns than younger CEOs’, at 
a projection of 1% less revenue for every one year that they aged.  Education of CEOs’ 
had no significant relationship to change of revenues.  However, a change in S&P 
corresponded with an increase in revenues, indicating that other factors affected firm 
performance based on revenues, and shareholders should consider external factors that 
might affect revenues (Arbogast & Mirabella, 2014).   
Pandher and Currie (2013) investigated how strategic factors related to firm 
capacity related to the CEOs’ compensation and firm revenues.  According to Pandher 
and Currie, evaluating revenue and the firm value was important to understand CEOs’ 
compensation.  Revenue is important because net income represents the resource 
advantages of the firm.  Moreover, income is the difference between net revenues and 
expenses.  Pandher and Currie’s study results indicated that powerful CEOs’ could not 
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receive high pay if the resource advantages (revenues, market value) of the firm were low 
while CEOs’ with low power could receive high pay in firms with high resource 
advantages.  In addition, Pandher and Currie also noted that corporate strategies that 
increased firm resource advantages increased CEOs’ bargaining power relative to other 
stakeholders, leading to increased CEOs’ cash, equity, and total compensation.  Strategic 
actions taken by the firms reported as adding firm value included offshoring production 
to increase revenues and reduce costs.     
Other researchers studied the relationship between using stock options to 
remunerate top corporate executives and improved firm performance (Akinloye, 2012; 
Sigler, 2011).  Akinloye’s (2012) study results indicated that contributions of executive 
stock options to firm performance became progressively smaller as time advanced.  One 
of the performance metrics used by Akinloye was operating revenues of the firm, which 
revealed that sampled firms that were profitable used executive stock options extensively 
to remunerate executives.  However, Sigler (2011) posited that some CEOs’ 
compensation payments such as bonuses tied to current accounting numbers could make 
managers manipulate the timing of revenues and expenses to maximize their payouts, and 
using equity incentives helped because of the lengthy time horizon of this payment 
approach.  Therefore, the vesting nature of stock options, which limits immediate payouts 
to CEO, might be more appropriate as the CEO’s remuneration is when the stock price 
increases.    
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Performance in Pharmaceutical Industry 
Prescription drug spending in the United States reached $307 billion in 2010, an 
increase of $135 billion since 2001, and comprised approximately 12% of all healthcare 
spending in the country (U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012).  The 
pharmaceutical industry has performance challenges not found in other sectors and a 
measure of performance is the drug development process (Brown, 2013).  Brown (2013) 
noted that in the pharmaceutical industry, it could take years before realizing the full risks 
or benefits.  Pharmaceutical products are subject to more volumes of data, regulatory 
oversight, and competition from manufacturers of generic products (Koku, 2011).  Koku 
(2011) stated that because the industry has an impact on the health of consumers, the 
industry is regulated than other industries, making the approval process expensive and 
time-consuming. 
Koku (2011) reviewed data from 550 pharmaceutical companies from 1980 to 
2000 and analyzed the relationship between ROE, R&D expenditure, selling and 
marketing, and media coverage, with ROE as the dependent variable.  Koku’s results 
revealed that the market did not react to media announcements by managers, but there 
was a significant relationship between decisions made by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) on ROE.  Koku attributed this positive relationship between the 
ROE and FDA to the uncertain nature of the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA 
approval process.  In general, FDA approval takes an average of 10 to 15 years of R&D 
(Prajapati & Dureja, 2012), making drug development process to be time consuming, 
uncertain, and expensive. 
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Study results have revealed that performance in the pharmaceutical industry 
depends on product lifecycles (Prajapati & Dureja, 2012).  Prajapati and Dureja (2012) 
stated that product lifecycle management (PLM) allows a company to manage the way in 
which a product is sourced, manufactured, and sold actively.  However, according to 
Prajapati and Dureja, there is a need to review pharmaceutical PLM to improve 
pharmaceutical industry competitiveness.  Prajapati and Dureja highlighted some of the 
challenges faced by pharmaceutical companies as the escalation of development cost, the 
decline in R&D productivity, and the narrowing return on investments.  The average 
development costs of a drug vary from $500 million to $2 billion and the number of new 
drugs approved by the FDA in 2010 was half the number approved in 1996 because of 
the stringent regulatory environment (Prajapati & Dureja, 2012).  In addition, Prajapati 
and Dureja noted that the modern patent protection period, designed to allow companies 
to recoup costs incurred during R&D, had narrowed to an average of 5 to 8 years for most 
drugs.  Narrowing patent protection period leaves pharmaceutical companies with shorter 
durations to recoup investments in the development of these drugs (Prajapati & Dureja, 
2012).  
Other studies have focused on how performance in the pharmaceutical industry is 
affected by changes in demographics.  Walter (2012) and Burrill (2014) examined pricing 
pressures from regulatory bodies, necessitating leaders of pharmaceutical companies to 
look beyond their products for new revenue opportunities.  Walter analyzed how 
demographic patterns affect demand for pharmaceutical products, affecting ROE.  
According to Walter, the timing of stock market reactions to demographic changes is 
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crucial for pharmaceutical industry ROE.  To understand the relationship between ROE 
in the pharmaceutical industry and demographic changes, Walter (2012) analyzed 60 
companies for the period of 1986 to 2008.  Using a time series model, Walter reviewed 
changes in demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau, drug age patterns, sales, and 
ROE.  Walter reviewed only data from sales of the top 20 drugs of each company on an 
annual basis from 1986 to 2008.  Walter found that because of demographic patterns, 
long-term investors (horizon of 6–12 years) realized a positive ROE (yearly returns of 3–
5%), whereas for short-term investors (less than five years) realized a negative ROE.  In 
addition, because of heavy investment in R&D by pharmaceutical companies, 
calculations of metrics such as ROA are complicated, because the financials usually 
represent billions of dollars in intangible assets (Walter, 2012).   
Investors are interested in whether intangible assets and expenditures truly create 
shareholder value (Heiens, McGrath, & Leach, 2008).  Mergers have primarily driven 
growth in intangible assets when the cost of the acquired company exceeds the net assets 
acquired, creating goodwill, and from spending in R&D and advertising (Heiens et al., 
2008).  Heiens et al. (2008) examined how intangible assets affect shareholders’ value by 
reviewing data from 200 actively traded pharmaceutical firms for the period of 2000 to 
2005.  The researchers utilized holding period returns (HPR), an investment strategy 
associated with buy and hold strategy over a given time period.  To compute daily return 
for each firm, Heiens et al. considered the excess return of the stock price of each firm 
over the market return to calculate abnormal returns of the selected companies.  
Abnormal returns revealed what an investor would obtain above the market return.  
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Heiens et al.’s study results indicated that most pharmaceutical companies that invested 
heavily on R&D and advertisement had higher HPR, but this heightened HPR was only 
in the long term, rather than in the short term, and was probably the result of investments 
in R&D taking more time to yields benefits for ROE.   
Therefore, in the pharmaceutical industries, exploiting proprietary technologies 
such as technological licensing could increase firm value and shareholders wealth 
(Walter, 2012).  According to Walter (2012), large pharmaceutical firms have advantages 
in manufacturing and distribution that small firms often lack.  Small companies on the 
other hand have demonstrated advantages in generating a wide range of novel discoveries 
that large pharmaceuticals covert to fill their development pipelines (Walter, 2012).  
According to Walter, technology-licensing agreements between pharmaceutical firms 
could enable each group to leverage their distinctive competences while accessing those 
of the other.  
Transition and Summary 
In Section 1 of this study, I identified the current and historical issues relating to 
the adoption of CEOs’ stock options and firm performance in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Section 1 began with a discussion of the specific and general problem 
statements, which were the focus of this study.  After reviewing and analyzing previous 
research, the lack of available information for the pharmaceutical industry provided an 
opportunity for studying the relationship between CEOs’ stock options compensation and 
pharmaceutical industry performance in the United States.   
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In Section 2, I have identified and discussed the methodologies and strategies for 
this research.  I discussed my role as a researcher, the research method and design, the 
population and sampling methods, the participants in the study, data collection, analysis 
techniques, and validity of the study.  In Section 3, I provided the results of the data 




Section 2: The Project 
Over time, there has been an increase in stock-based and option-based executive 
compensation.  Leaders of firms responsible for this change often describe the increase in 
CEOs’ exposure to stock prices as a way to align upper management incentives with the 
interests of the shareholders (Banker et al., 2013).  However, this strategy may have 
yielded mixed results.  In particular, large stock option packages increase the incentives 
for managers to manipulate earnings (Arbogast & Mirabella, 2014).   
Optimal CEOs’ compensation strategies are dependent upon compensation 
committees developing appropriate strategies for compensation (Sun & Cahan, 2012).  
CEOs’ pay component may entice some executives to engage in activities that produce 
problems for the firm (Sigler, 2011).  According to Sigler (2011), executives could be 
tempted to manipulate accounting numbers when about to exercise their options, hoping 
to give an appearance of superior firm performance.  This section of the study includes a 
restatement of the purpose statement, role of the researcher, participants, research 
method, research design, population and sampling, instrumentation, data analysis, and 
study validity. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between ROE, ROI, annual revenues, and CEOs’ stock options awarded, 
while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The independent 
variables were the ROE, ROI, and total annual revenues.  The dependent variable was the 
value of CEO’s stock options granted.  Controlling variables were firm size, age of the 
57 
 
CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The targeted population comprised publicly traded 
pharmaceutical companies located within the United States.  The implications for positive 
social change include the potential to address societal concerns on increasing 
concentration of wealth to very high-earning salaried workers, in particular, CEOs’, and 
thereby improving economic and social distribution in the society (Bakija & Heim, 
2012).  The results of this study may also help improve the culture of transparency, 
dialogue, fairness, and trust in the work place (Moore, 2014). 
Role of the Researcher 
My role as a researcher was restricted to retrieving and analyzing pharmaceutical 
industry financial data as reported to SEC.  I collected and analyzed data using 
correlational analyzes to make inferences about a larger population.  I summarized and 
reported the findings and made recommendations for future research.  Additional roles 
included selecting a sample for the study, rechecking recorded values, and organizing 
data in Excel spreadsheets.   
It is imperative for the researcher to recognize the ethical issues of a study while 
planning and conducting the study, exploring the evidence, and using the information 
gained from research (Kar, 2011).  This research topic was of particular interest to me as 
a financial analyst in the pharmaceutical industry managing stock options plans.  
However, I did not include my employer in the study sample.  I used secondary data for 
this research.  Publicly owned U.S companies, the target population of this study, had 




Collected data was stored on an encrypted, password-protected computer and only 
available to me.  I will destroy all data 5 years after the completion of this study. Most 
researchers locate existing data and synthesize them to form a conclusion (Exner, 2014).  
I cannot control the reporting to SEC of financial reports and proxy statements.  Firms 
dropped from databases from poor performance or privately acquired could present 
survivorship bias by overstating or understating performance (Linnainmaa, 2013).  While 
the data was archival and assumed reliable, it is paramount that my analysis and 
interpretation be unbiased, accurate, and reported in an ethical manner.  
Participants 
In ensuring participants met pharmaceutical companies eligibility, the participants 
list was verified against SIC code 2834, pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing 
(U.S Census Bureau, 2012).  In addition, the participants in this quantitative correlational 
study were public listed pharmaceutical companies; hence, strategies for establishing a 
working relationship with participants were not necessary (Coffie, 2013).  Public listed 
companies in U.S are required to file publicly their financial statements with the SEC 
(Moore, 2014).    
I chose a specific industry, pharmaceutical industry, to determine the relationship 
between CEO’s stock options and firm performance.  According to Offstein and 
Gnyawali (2005), aggregating industries into a single omnibus sample makes it difficult 
to detect compensation effects that are likely to be industry-specific. Sigler (2011) stated 
that the mixing of the different components into a complex compensation package for 
executives allows the shortcomings of one component to be offset by the strengths of 
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another.  In addition, although CEOs’ compensation consists of many components, I 
investigated only stock options awarded to CEOs’ as compensation.  I selected data on 
CEOs’ stock options from form DEF 14A filed with the SEC (SEC, 2014). 
Some researchers have also argued that industries that invest heavily in R&D are 
likely to award their executives with stock options to encourage innovation (Koku, 2011; 
Sheikh, 2012).  By investing in R&D, many pharmaceutical companies hope to discover 
new products or improve existing products; when successful, these products could 
improve the financial position of the firm (Koku, 2011).  Sheikh (2012) analyzed 14,758 
firm-years between 1992 to 2004 and found a positive association between increases in 
CEO’s stock option awards to increases in both innovative inputs (R&D expenditures) 
and output (patents and citations).  Pharmaceutical companies faced with regulatory 
challenges need to innovate new products to ensure that they use their earnings and 
capital appropriately. 
Research Method 
In this study, I adopted a quantitative correlational approach to collect and 
analyze data. Researchers engaged in quantitative research employ large and random 
samples, reduce complex phenomena to a few variables, test hypotheses, and thus deduce 
inferences (Bergman, 2011).  The research method entailed a review of pharmaceutical 
companies financial statements filed with SEC (SEC, 2014).  The objective of the this 
research was to determine whether and to what extent a relationship existed between firm 
performance, measured by ROE, ROI, and annual revenues to stock options awarded to 
CEOs’ in pharmaceutical companies.  In developing the research design for this study, I 
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reviewed Ayiro’s (2012) work on educational research methods and statistics, including 
theoretical fit (reliability and validity), describing data, and testing hypotheses.   
The pros and cons of research methods should be argued in relation to their 
specific context, including research question posed and resources available for research 
(Allwood, 2011).  Academicians can choose among three methods when conducting 
research: (a) quantitative, (b) qualitative, or (c) mixed methods (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 
2013).  Based upon the purpose of this study to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO’s stock options, I selected a quantitative research method 
(Allwood, 2011).  A quantitative study involves researchers asking precoded questions 
with numeric value response options to examine the relationship between variables 
(Curtis & Drennan, 2013).  Teo (2013) asserted that quantitative approaches best 
addresses problems in situations in which researchers want to understand which variables 
or factors influence outcomes.  
Other research methods were available to conduct this study.  I did not select 
either a qualitative or a mixed method for a number of reasons.  A qualitative method was 
not appropriate choice for this study because qualitative study’s inductive nature 
precludes defining variables and hypotheses before conducting the research (Ogussakin, 
2015).  Qualitative researchers explores questions such as what, why, how, rather than 
how many or how much; focusing on meaning rather than measuring (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2013).  According to Cooper and Schindler (2013), understanding why 
individuals and groups think and behave as they do lies at the heart of qualitative 
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research.  Findings in qualitative analysis are context-specific, unlike in quantitative 
analysis, where findings could be generalizable to a large population (Moore, 2014).  
A mixed method was not appropriate for this study.  Mixed method would involve 
collecting both quantitative and qualitative data for the study (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 
2013). However, for this study, there was no coherent method for combining qualitative 
results with quantitative data to achieve the study goals.  The choice of a research method 
could influence greatly the data collections and analysis of the research study (Converse, 
2012).  The application of triangulation in research yields to complementary of the mixed 
methods as researchers use quantitative techniques to further develop findings derived 
from qualitative techniques and vice versa (Copper, 2012).  Constraints such as time and 
resources could render using a mixed method approach impractical (Ridder, 2012).  In 
addition, studies on the relationship between CEO’s stock options and firm performance 
tend to favor the use of quantitative approach; remaining consistent would allow building 
upon the work of previous scholars (Essaid, 2013; Moore, 2014), allowing easy 
comparison of information.   
A quantitative approach was more appropriate than the qualitative approach to 
determine the associations among ROI, ROE, annual revenues, and CEO’s stock options 
compensation.  I sought to infer the relationship between CEO’s stock options and firm 
performance within the pharmaceutical industry, while controlling for firm size, age of 
the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  Big data are not only about the data, but also about 
analyzing those data and the resulting theoretical and empirical understanding of how 
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individuals, groups, and societies think and behave.  Therefore, the quantitative research 
method was the most appropriate method for use in this study.   
Research Design 
Quantitative techniques are appropriate for identifying the relationship between 
variables (Joanne, 2012).  I considered three quantitative research designs, including (a) 
experimental, (b) quasi-experimental, and (c) correlational design.  The experimental 
design involves the random assignment of variables to test the effectiveness of 
interventions between two groups (Joanne, 2012).  For the purpose of this study, no test 
of interventions between groups was necessary.  Quasi-experimental is designed to 
investigate the effect of one variable on other variables but lacks the element of random 
assignment of variables (Aussems, Boomsma, & Snijders, 2009).  In this study, no 
manipulation of variables to measure its effect on other variables was required.  
Therefore, the appropriate study design was hierarchal and nonexperimental (Martinez, 
2014). 
I used hierarchical regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
independent variables (ROE, ROI, and annual revenue) and the dependent variable 
(CEO’s stock options) while moderating for firm size, the age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure.  Hierarchical regression was a conservative method of testing the hypothesis; 
entering control variables into the regression model before the variables of theoretical 
interest are analyzed (McClelland et al., 2012).  Signs of the regression coefficients are 
used to indicate the relationship between variables and may range from -1 (a perfect 
negative relationship) to 0 (no relationship) to a +1 (a perfect positive relationship).   
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I adapted my study from previous research on health care industry by Sigler 
(2003).  Sigler tested the relationship between cash compensation of healthcare CEOs’ 
and organization financial performance.  This study included an analysis of the 
relationship between stock options awarded to CEOs’ in pharmaceutical companies and 
organizational financial performance.  Stock options constituted only a trivial percentage 
of CEOs’ pay in the 1970s but grew to a dominant form of pay by the late 1990s (Murphy 
& Trefftzs, 2012).   
While firm performance is measured by many variables (e.g., return on assets, 
assets ratio, equity ratio, net profit margin), for the purpose of this study, I used ROE, 
ROI, and annual revenues.  Fathi et al. (2012) stated that ROE measures the impact of 
management on shareholders’ wealth, and Bihari (2014) stated that ROE is a key 
indicator of stock price.  Pandher and Currie (2013) found a positive relationship between 
firm revenues and firm performance.  Pandher and Currie stated that CEOs’ use resource- 
based advantage (the difference between revenues and expenses) to bargain for higher 
compensation.   
Sigler (2003) asserted that there is a positive and significant link between annual 
revenues and CEOs’ compensation.  Moderated variables for this study were the size of 
the firm, CEO’s tenure, and CEO’s age.  Ozkan (2011) found CEO’s tenure and age of 
CEO might be related to the entrenchment of the CEO, leading to compensation not tied 
to the performance of the firm.  Lin and Lin (2014) found a significant positive 
relationship between CEO’s compensation and firm size.  Larger firms are typically more 
complex, and CEOs’ are therefore highly compensated (Lin & Lin, 2014).  I selected 
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ROE because this measure reflects how well a firm performs from the shareholders’ point 
of view (Lin & Lin, 2014) and annual revenues, which is an indicator of core earnings of 
the firm (Ettredge, Schliz, Smith, & Sun, 2010).  
Population and Sampling 
Researchers should identify an optimal design that supports the research problem 
and guide in the selection of the sample (Xu & Yuen, 2014).  In this study, publicly 
traded pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. were the population sample.  Available data 
were publicly disclosed data from financial information and proxy statements.  This 
sample contained data available within the pharmaceutical industry and was a simple 
random sampling, with every element of the sample having an equal likelihood of 
selection (Murray, Rugeley, Mitchell, & Mondok, 2013).  However, I exempted 
companies with either annual revenues of less than $40 million or market capitalization 
of less than $75 million from the study.  According to the SEC (2014), companies with 
less than $75 million in market capitalization or less than $40 million in revenues qualify 
as a smaller reporting company and are exempted from filing proxy statements to the 
SEC. 
For probability sampling, randomization, rather than assumptions about the 
structure of the population, is the characteristic feature of the selection process (Verma, 
2014).  The LexisNexis Academic database included data on 115 public pharmaceutical 
companies for years 2007 to 2015.  I conducted a power analysis, using G*Power 
Version 3.1.9.2 software, to determine the appropriate sample size for the study.  
G*Power is a statistical package used to conduct a priori sample size analysis (Faul, 
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Erdfelder, Bunchner, & Lang, 2009).  An a priori power analysis, assuming a medium 
effect size (f = .15), a = .05, indicated that a minimum sample of 77 companies would be 
required to achieve a power of .80 (See Appendix C).  Increasing the sample size to 99 
increased the power to .90 (See Appendix D).  Therefore, my sample of 115 companies 
was appropriate for the study (Clay, 2014).   
For this study, I utilized a random sampling technique to select listed public 
pharmaceutical companies included in the LexisNexis Academic database using SIC code 
2834, pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).  Studies 
in accounting, finance, business, and economics frequently employ SIC codes to identify 
industries for research (Kile & Phillips, 2009).  I selected performance data of the 
selected pharmaceutical companies (ROE, annual revenues, and company assets) from 
Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ (2014).  The Standard & Poor’s database provides 
executives and directors compensation analysis for U.S. companies listed among the S&P 
1500 (Nancy & Fall, 2012).   
I selected data on CEO’s stock options from proxy statement Form DEF 14A filed 
with the SEC (SEC, 2014).  The goal of the study was to examine the relationship 
between CEO’s stock options compensation and accounting measures of firm 
performance (ROI, ROE and annual revenues) in the pharmaceutical industry while 
moderating for firm size, age of CEO, and CEO’s tenure.  Sigler (2003) examined the 
relationship between CEO’s cash compensation and the performance of the healthcare 




Ethical guidelines are critical in research studies (Clay, 2015).  All Walden 
University doctoral students are responsible for ensuring that they submit their proposal 
for institutional review board (IRB) for review by the faculty, and an IRB approval 
number assigned.  This study satisfied Walden University ethical standards and assigned 
approval number 05-15-16-0400586.  For this study, IRB approval was important before 
participants’ recruitment or data collection efforts begin.  IRBs are locally administered 
groups whose members undertake a review of research protocols involving humans to 
ensure the protocols adhere to federal regulations, adequately protect human participants’ 
rights and welfare, and are ethically sound (Wao et al., 2014).  Researchers are required 
to demonstrate the ethical acceptability of their projects to the IRB at the institution under 
whose auspices the research is conducted (Thomson, 2013). 
This study involved analyzing publicly available data that public companies in the 
United States must file with the SEC (2014).  As such, no ethical procedures or concerns 
were associated with the data, other than the general ethical directives of analyzing data 
honestly and disseminating results.  As with any research, when using secondary data, the 
researcher should confirm that the original study had ethical approval (Curtis & Drennan, 
2013).  Since I used archival data and no human participants, there was no need for 
documentation on informed consent or confidentiality (Moore, 2014).  I collected 
publicly available data on companies from Walden University websites, Standard & 
Poor’s, and LexisNexis Academic databases.  I assigned a numerical value for each 
company to keep the samples anonymous.  In addition, all data collected for this research 
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study will be stored on an encrypted, password-protected computer and be available to 
me only.  I will destroy collected data five years after the completion of this study.   
Data Collection Instruments 
Questionnaires or instruments are tools used to collect information relevant to the 
questions or aims and objectives of a study (Curtis & Drennan, 2013).  For this study, I 
used secondary data; hence, data collection instruments such as surveys and 
questionnaires were not required.  A review of the literature on the relationship between 
firm performance and CEOs’ compensation revealed no use of surveys or questionnaires 
instruments (Moore, 2014; Sigler, 2003).  Measurements used when measuring firm 
performance include financial indicators such as ROE, ROI, free cash flow, revenues, etc. 
(Pham, 2015).  However, although no surveys and questionnaires instruments are used, 
maintaining study reliability and validity is important (Hagan, 2014).  Below are the 
details of the variables used in this study 
Table 2 
Variables used in the Study 
Dependent Independent 
CEO’s Stock Option Return on Equity 
 Return on Investment 





Data Type of Dependent Variables 
Dependent  Scale 
CEO’s Stock Option Expressed as thousands of dollars 
 
Table 4 
Data Type of Independent Variables 
Independent Scale 
Return on Equity Expressed as a ratio 
Return on Investment Expressed as a ratio 
Annual Revenues Expressed as thousands of dollars 
 
I obtained study data from SEC EDGAR filings (EDGAR Online, 2014), 
LexisNexis Academic (2015), and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ (2014) (See Appendix 
E).  All public companies in the United States are required by law to file financial 
measurements, industry data, and company information with the SEC (SEC, 2014).  SEC 
data are reliable because registered companies must disclose important financial 
information, and an external auditor must audit this information.  According to SEC 
requirements, an independent auditor must examine the financial statements that 
management of a company has prepared and issue an opinion.  Auditor’s opinion 
indicates the auditor’s endorsement of the accuracy and adequacy of firm’s financial 
position (SEC, 2014). 
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The LexisNexis Academic database contained data on industry based on SIC 
codes (LexisNexis Academic, 2015).  However, the LexisNexis Academic (2015) 
database contained only current-year financial performance, necessitating use of the 
Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ.  Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ contained (a) company 
profile, (b) industry data, and (c) six years of company financial performance (S&P 
Capital IQ, 2015).  When conducting financial studies, researchers use databases such as 
Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ and LexisNexis Academic for companies’ data. 
There was a possibility of survivorship bias in data collected.  Survivorship 
occurs when the database does not include non-surviving firms (Bali et al., 2011).  
Exclusion of these companies could lead to skewed results and conclusions.  In 
identifying possible survivorship bias, I compared data from SEC and Standard & Poor’s 
Capital IQ (2014).   
For this research, I used three databases: (a) LexisNexis Academic, (b) Standard 
& Poor’s Capital IQ (2014), and (c) SEC filings.  LexisNexis Academic database 
contained data on publicly listed companies.  Form DEF-14A filed with the SEC 
contained information on CEO’s compensation, age, and tenure while the Standard & 
Poor’s Capital IQ database contained information on company performance (return on 
equity, return on equity, and annual revenues) for the previous six years.  NexisLexis 
Academic aggregates financial reports in a database for each corporate filing and was 
accessible via the Walden University Library.   
The independent variables for this study were ROE, ROI, and annual revenue.  
ROE is the measure of return on equity for pharmaceutical companies, measured as net 
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income divided by total equity to shareholders.  ROE is used to measure stockholders’ 
wealth due to the role of business profit on stockholders’ profit (Fathi et al., 2012).  ROI 
is a performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency of investments (Moore, 2014).  
Revenues were annual sales reported by the firm in the 10K report.  The dependent 
variable was stock options granted to the CEO’s, as reported on Form DEF-14A filed 
with the SEC.  Managers’ stock options are incentives given managers to align managers’ 
interests with those of the shareholders by linking managers’ wealth to the firm value 
(Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012).  The controlled variables were firm size, age of the 
CEO’s, and the CEO’s tenure.  Firm size was the total assets reported by the firm, as 
found in the 10K report.  CEO’s age was the numerical age of the CEO, as reported on 
Form DEF-14A.  CEO’s tenure was the number of years that the CEO has held that 
position in the firm. 
Data Collection Technique 
I used archival data for this study.  I collected secondary data from the SEC 
EDGAR database (EDGAR Online, 2014), Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ (2014), and 
LexisNexis Academic (2015).  I obtained the list of all pharmaceutical companies from 
LexisNexis Academic using SIC code 2834.  Offstein and Gnyawali (2005) investigated 
CEO’s compensation in the pharmaceutical industry and used SIC 2834 to select the 
study sample.  Using SIC code 2834, I downloaded a list of publicly traded 
pharmaceutical companies based in the U.S.   
The primary advantages of using secondary data were that the data had already 
been collected, and there were potential time and resource savings (Kiecolt & Nathan, 
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2015).  Hyunju (2013) stated that using secondary data could aid a researcher interested 
in reviewing many years of data.  The advent of computer technology means that 
researchers have the capacity to manipulate large data collections and to use complex 
methods of analysis (Fienberg, Martin, & Straf, 1985).  However, using secondary data 
has several limitations.  The primary limitation of secondary data is the use of data not 
originally collected for the purpose of the study.  This was a potential problem because 
secondary data only approximate the kind of data intended for testing the study 
hypothesis (Pham, 2015).  Gaillet (2015) noted several limitations of archived data: (a) 
researchers often do not know what to find in archives or what information will be 
important later, (b) the practical reality that researchers often do not have access or 
finances to revisit a physical collection, and (c) sometimes the difficulty of making sense 
from archived data. 
To supplement data obtained from Standard & Poor’s and LexisNexis Academic, 
I also used Form DEF 14A to obtain the name, age, and tenure of the CEO’s of the 
selected pharmaceutical firms.  The SEC (2014) recommended using Form DEF-14A for 
information on executive compensation because it is the final proxy statement.  The form 
14A component of the name of the form refers to proxy statements, filed in pursuit of 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Act of 1934 (SEC, 2014).   
I used the NexisLexis Academic database to download a list of pharmaceutical 
companies with headquarters in the U.S.  In addition, I used data from LexisNexis 
Academic to search for financial performance of companies for the previous six years.  
Data selected on CEO’s compensation and company financial performance of companies 
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focused on pharmaceutical companies for the period from 2008 to 2014.  I selected this 
period because of the impact of new regulations such as the Affordable Care Act (2010).  
The Affordable Care Act contains provisions for helping clients, but the size, scope, and 
complexity of the Act is overwhelming (Martin, Meehan, & Schackman, 2013.). 
Data Analysis 
What is the relationship between return on equity, return on investment, annual 
revenues, and CEO’s stock options awards, while controlling for firm size, age of the 
CEO, and the CEO’s tenure?  
Hypotheses 
H01: Return on equity, return on investments, and annual revenues would not 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, age of the CEO’, 
and the CEO’s tenure. 
Ha1: Return on equity, return on investments, and annual revenues would 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, 
and the CEO’s tenure. 
I examined the extent and nature of the overall relationship of firm performance, 
measured by ROE, ROI, and annual revenues, to stock options awarded to CEOs’ using a 
quantitative, correlational design.  I used a hierarchical regression model to test the 
independent variables of ROE, ROI, and annual revenues of firms to dependent variable 
of CEO’s stock options, while controlling for the size of the firm, age of the CEO, and 
the CEO’s tenure (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012).   
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Management scholars have used multiple regression models to examine the 
relationship between CEO’s compensation to firm performance.  For example, Moore 
(2014) used a hierarchical regression to examine the relation between CEO’s 
compensation to firm performance.  Zondervan (2015) used a multiple regression model 
to specify the relationship between financial performance and CEO’s compensation.  
Siger (2003) used a regression model to examine the relationship between CEO’s salaries 
to firm annual revenues.  In addition, Paz (2012) used a regression model to examine the 
impact of stock option expensing as part of CEO’s compensation and earnings quality.  
A hierarchical regression analysis is a type of linear regression model in which 
observations fall into hierarchical levels (Moore, 2014).  In this study, it was important 
that I controlled how I input variables into the models.  Using hierarchical regression 
allowed in specifying a fixed order of entry for predictor variables (Cooper, 2012).  In 
Hierarchical regression, the researcher, not the computer determines the order of entry of 
the variables (Moore, 2014).  The dependent variable (stock options), followed by the 
control variables (age of CEO’s, tenure of CEO’s, and size of the firm) were put into 
hierarchical model first.  This order ensures that the control variables get credit for any 
variability they may have with stock options (Joanne, 2012).  After controlling for the 
effect of controlled variables, then financial performance variables (ROE, ROI, and 
annual revenues) were input into the model to evaluate how much predictive power they 
had on stock options awards (Regression with SPSS, 2014).   
I also chose hierarchical design mainly based on the purpose of the study and 
nature of the independent, dependent, and control variables.  A hierarchical regression is 
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a model comparison approach in which richer models are compared to simple models to 
infer if additional regressors account for a statistically significant amount of variance 
(Damien, 2013).  I considered other statistical analyses such as ANOVA and logistic 
regression.  ANOVA is used to measure variability between and within groups (Klimberg 
& McCullough, 2013).  The objective of this study was to explore the relationship 
between firm performance, measured by annual revenues and ROE, to stock options 
awarded to CEOs’, and not the analysis of variance (Davis, 2013).  Logistic regression is 
designed for use in studies in which the response variable is a categorical variable with 
two possible values (Glynn & Robinson, 2014).  Logistic regression is distinguishable 
from multiple linear regression analysis in that the dependent variable is categorical in 
nature and assumes a nonlinear relationship between the explanatory variables (Teo, 
2013).  For this study, none of the variables was a categorical variable; thus, logistic 
regression was not appropriate.  A hierarchical regression design is used to understand 
the cause-and-effect relationship between one dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables (Klimberg & McCullough, 2013).  For this correlation design, I 
used SPSS Version 21 software to determine the direction of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. 
Data cleaning and screening involves the detection, removal of errors, and 
inconsistencies in data set (Pham, 2015).  Leo (2013) recommended that researchers 
should look for the following in data screening and cleaning: (a) look for coding errors, 
(b) look for outliers, (c) check for logical consistency of answers, and (d) decide how to 
deal with incorrect or missing values.  To clean and address missing data, I used a bar 
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graph to look for outliers (Moore, 2014).  I also used cross-tabulating pairs of variables to 
root out for data inconsistencies (Regression with SPSS, 2014).  In addition, I also went 
back to data source to fill in the missing data or remove incorrect values (Miranda, 2015). 
In conducting inferential statistics, I checked the data for outliers.  To check for 
the normality of variable, I used descriptive data such as mean, mode, median, standard 
deviations, minimum, maximum, and bar graphs.  The effect size of the sample was 
calculated using a G*power statistical software to determine the appropriate sample size. 
After all assumptions were met, regression outputs, including correlation coefficient, F-
ratio, beta, R-square, adjusted R-squared, R-square change values were evaluated. The F-
ratio of ANOVA is reported to indicate the overall regression used for statistical analysis 
of data and whether the independent variables statistically predict the dependent variables 
(Pham, 2015).  The R-value provided the indication of the quality ty of the prediction of 
the prediction variable.  The R-squared provided the proportion of variance that could be 
explained by the independent variables while adjusted R-square also included the sample 
size.  The R-square change indicated the change in R-square, indicating the predictive 
capacity of the dependent variable in the regression model. 
 Most researchers using statistical tests rely upon certain assumptions about 
variables used in the analysis (Regression with SPSS, 2014).  In this study, I assumed that 
certain assumptions were not violated.  Specifically, the assumptions were: (a) outliers, 
(b) linearity, (c) multicollinearity, (d) normality, (e) homoscedasticity, and (e) 
independence of residuals (Leo, 2013).  Violations of these assumptions would have 
required data transformations as a minimum (Miranda, 2015).   
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In linear regression, an outlier is an observation in which the value of the 
dependent variable is unusual and contains high residuals (Miranda, 2015). According to 
Leo (2013), the best way to address outliers is to examine a scatter diagrams and 
residuals of each variable.  In addition, Moore, 2014 recommended performing a 
Mahalanobis distance test to access for multivariate normality.  Accordingly, I used a 
scatter plot of all my study variables and performed a Mahalanobis test on the variables.  
I also performed the assumption test for multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity is an 
adverse situation whether the correlations between the independent variables are very 
strong (Regression with SPSS, 2014).  If a strong correlation existed between stock 
options and firm performance, these variables would have conveyed the same 
information and regression results would have been paradoxical (Miranda, 2015).  I used 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test to flag for multicollinearity (Leo, 2013).  A VIF 
result score of 1, means no strong correlation between the independent variables.  If the 
VIF score is 10 or above, one of the study variables is removed (Pham, 2015). 
In linear regression, an assessment of the normality of the data is essential 
because of the underlying assumptions that the data is normally distributed (Regression 
with SPSS, 2014).  I used Skewness tests in SPSS to determine the normality of the data 
(McDonald, 2015).  If skew is greater than -1 or less than +1, the distribution of the data 
would be considered normal (McDonald, 2015).  However, data with a skew value of less 
than -1 or greater than +1 would be considered highly Skewed and not normally 
distributed (McDonald, 2015).  For data that is highly skewed, transformation of data 
variables using data transformations techniques such as log transformations and square 
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roots reduces data skewness (McDonald, 2015).  I also used boxplots and scatter plots 
before making a final determination (Leo, 2013). 
Homoscedasticity, also known as homogeneity of variance, assumes that the 
dependent variable exhibits similar amount of variance across the range of the 
independent variables (Miranda, 2015).  In homoscedasticity, the error variance would be 
constant between the variables (Regression with SPSS, 2014).  To test for 
homoscedasticity, I conducted a scatterplot graph (Leo, 2013).  Ideally, residuals 
randomly scattered around the horizontal line, means a relatively even distribution 
(Kiecolt & Nathan, 2015).  
Issues of independence of residuals could be very serious (Regression with SPSS, 
2014).  Independence of residuals is when errors of one observation are not in correlation 
with errors of other observations (Miranda, 2015).  Independence of residuals is a 
problem for time-series data (Leo, 2013).  I used the Durbin-Watson test in SPSS to look 
for serial correlation (Regression with SPSS, 2014).  The Durbin-Watson test ranges from 
0 to 4.  The residuals are uncorrelated when the Durbin-Watson test is approximately 2 
(Miranda, 2015).  A value close to 0 indicates strong positive correlation, while a value of 
4 indicates strong negative correlation (Regression with SPSS, 2014). 
 The hierarchical regression included stock options awarded to CEO’s as the 
dependent variable to predict the performance of firms after controlling for the size of the 
firm, the age of the CEO’s, and the CEO’s tenure.  I entered control variables into SPSS 
before firm performance variables to ensure that the controls did not explain away the 
entire association between firm performance and CEO’s stock options awarded.  I 
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excluded cases pairwise to detect missing data, and list wise deleted any entries with 
missing data.   
Researchers encounter missing information that may occur for reasons not 
anticipated (Pham, 2015).  For this study, I only analyzed companies with complete 
financial data.  The most common method and the easiest to apply is the use of only those 
cases with complete information (Leo, 2013).  Leo stated that using only cases with 
available data has simplicity and comparable across analysis.  However, according to Leo 
this reduces statistical power because it lowers N and does not use all information.  
Nevertheless, I had a large sample to select from to mitigate loss of statistical power from 
a lower N.  
Study Validity 
The study validity refers to the extent to which certain measurement satisfies the 
purpose for which it is selected (Pham, 2015).  The quality element that could have 
undermined the study was the accuracy of financial records filed with SEC (SEC, 2014).  
Historical financial information filed with the SEC was the primary source of data for this 
study.  The SEC staff collects data from public companies on a quarterly and annual 
basis, as per federal security laws (SEC, 2014).  Internal validity relates the extent to 
which the design of a research study is a good test of the hypothesis (Hobart et al., 2013).  
For this study, I identified three threats to internal validity.  The first threat to internal 
validity was the possibility that some companies could have filed restated financial 
information with the SEC, which could affected study data.  Restatements of financial 
statements had resulted in an approximately $100 billion decline in market capitalization 
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(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2014).  The second threat to internal validity 
related to the changing nature on the disclosure of CEO’s compensation as required by 
SEC.  Statement 123 by FASB requires more frequent disclosures in financial statements 
about the effects of stock-based compensation (FASB, 2014).  The third threat to internal 
validity was that, other variables, other than ROE, ROI, and annual revenues, explain 
CEO’s compensation (Teo, 2013).   
For increased internal validity, the researcher should ensure that the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables cannot be explained by any other 
variable (Peer, Zyngier, & Hakemulder, 2012).  There was a chance that other variables 
might have affected study results on the relationship between ROI, ROE, annual 
revenues, and stock options offered to the CEO.  To increase statistical validity, I used a 
hierarchical or sequential regression model, which allowed me to examine the 
relationship between a set of independent variables and a dependent variable, after 
controlling the effect of some other independent variables on the dependent variable 
(Teo, 2013).  In the regression model, I controlled the regressors (age of CEO, the CEO’s 
tenure, and size of the firm) before assessing the primary regressors (ROE, ROI, and 
annual revenues) because the regressors might have explained a large portion of the 
variance.  Adding variables in the regression equation, one at a time, maximizes the R² 
(Frydenberg & Reevy, 2015).   
In fostering internal validity of this study, I looked at previous researchers’ 
variables and analysis (Akinloye & Hussein, 2012; Sigler, 2011).  Sigler (2011) 
examined the relationship between CEO’s pay and company performance of 280 firms 
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listed on the NYSE while Akinloye and Hussein (2012) assessed the impact of CEO’s 
options and compensation.  In addition to these previously used variables, I used six years 
of data from company financial statements, as well as CEO’s stock options to enhance 
the validity of data (Zohrabi, 2013).  I also had an adequate sample size to mitigate the 
risk of making inappropriate claims about the population (Clay, 2014).  The desired 
sample size for this study was 115 pharmaceuticals companies with revenues of more 
than $75 million. 
External validity is the extent to which the results of a study can be generalized    
to other settings (Thomson, 2013).  For this study, I used a representative sample to assist 
in establishing external validity.  However, because the study sample consisted of only 
publicly listed pharmaceutical companies, the results may not be generalized to privately 
owned companies (Heughebaert & Manugart, 2012).  For this study, I focused on 
pharmaceutical industry; therefore, users of this study may not generalize results to other 
industries (Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005).  In addition, since I looked at companies based 
in United Stated, the study results may not be generalized to companies based in other 
countries.  However, users of this study might apply the results to other public companies 
that offer CEO’s stock options.   
Transition and Summary 
 In Section 2, I identified key points, which included the purpose statement on 
what is the relationship between ROE, ROI, annual revenues, and CEO’s stock options, 
while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and CEO’s tenure.  Section 2 contained 
the study methodology (quantitative) and design (correlational) I selected for this study.  I 
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explained the rationale for selecting a quantitative methodology for this study instead of 
other methodologies (mixed or qualitative).  In addition, I also explained why a 
correlational design was appropriate for this study.  Section 2 included an explanation of 
how I collected data, how I interpreted these data relative to the study hypotheses, and 
potential implications of this study to other industries.   
In Section 3, I analyzed the downloaded data and interpreted the results.  
Moreover, a main component of Section 3 is the application of the results of this study to 
current professional practices of the pharmaceutical industry.  I also included a 
recommendation for action, a presentation of the study, further research, and my own 
reflections.  Additionally, Walden encourages students to concentrate on studies that have 
implications for social change.  As such, express implications in terms of tangible 
improvements to organizations and society are integral part of Section 3. 
82 
 
Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Executive stock options are an incentive mechanism that leads to the convergence 
of interest between the manager and the shareholders (Essid, 2014).  In this study, I 
examined the use of executive stock options in CEOs’ compensation packages to support 
the alignment of CEOs’ compensation and the firm performance.  Executive 
compensation continues to increase despite the SEC’s reform of 1992, which approved 
executive compensation reform and full disclosure of top executive compensation 
(Moore, 2014).  As stated in proxy statements, a primary responsibility of firms’ 
compensation committee is to review, approve, and oversee executive compensation 
(SEC, 2014).  Moreover, compensation committees are to use incentive programs such as 
stock options to promote alignment with stockholders interest (Essid, 2012).  Section 3 
contains an overview of the correlational quantitative study conducted to review the 
relationship between executive stock options to firm performance.  In this section, I 
presented the findings of the data analysis.  I also indicated how the findings apply to 
professional practice, implications for social change, and recommendations for actions. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study was to examine the 
relationship between ROE, ROI, total annual revenues, and CEO’s stock options 
awarded, while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The 
independent variables were ROE, ROI, and total annual revenues.  The dependent 
variable was CEO’s stock options.  Size of the firm, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure were the control variables.  The null hypothesis was that ROE, ROI, and annual 
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revenues would not significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm 
size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The alternative hypothesis was that ROE, 
ROI, and annual revenues would significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after 
controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and CEO’s tenure.  The alternative hypothesis 
was rejected and the null hypothesis was accepted.  The ROE, ROI, and annual revenues 
did not significantly predict CEO’s stock options awards, after controlling for firm size, 
age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.   
Presentation of the Findings  
In this subheading, I discuss testing of the assumptions, presented descriptive 
statistics, presented inferential statistic results, provided a theoretical conversation 
pertaining to the findings, and concluded with a concise summary.  I selected a 
hierarchical multiple regression model to examine the relationship between ROE, ROI, 
and annual revenues to CEO’s stock options, while controlling for firm size, age of CEO, 
and CEO’s tenure.  The independent variables were ROE, ROI and annual revenues.  The 
dependent variable was CEO’s stock options.  Using a hierarchical regression analysis 
allowed testing of the ability of ROE, ROI and annual revenues in predicting CEO’s 
stock options, while controlling for the effect of firm size, age of CEO, and CEO’s tenure 
on the CEO’s stock options awards.     
Tests of Assumptions 
 I evaluated the assumptions of multicollinearity, outliers, normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals.  Violating statistical assumptions may 
indicate study results that not trustworthy (McDonald, 2014).  According to McDonald, 
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knowledge and understanding of when violations of assumptions lead to serious biases, 
and when they are of little consequences, are essential to meaningful data analysis.  
Test for multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity occurs when the independent 
variables are not independent of each other (McDonald, 2014).  McDonald recommends 
using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test for multicollinearity among independent 
variables.  When no violation of the assumption of multicollinearity is present, the VIF 
values should be between 0.1 and 10 (Moore, 2014; Zondervan, 2015).  When I 
conducted the VIF test, the VIF values were within acceptable parameters, between 0 and 
10, and I assumed that the independent variables were not independent of each other (see 
Table 5).  
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics – Skewness of Variables and Collinearity Results 
Variables N Skew SE 
 
VIF 
Options 269 5.083 .149  
Revenues 269 3.849 .149 9.428 
ROE 269 -.386 .149 7.873 
ROI 269 -.197 .149 7.964 
Assets 269 4.250 .149 8.501 
Age 269 .272 .149 1.110 
Tenure 269 1.246 .149 1.169 
Note. Options, Revenues, Assets and Tenure have large positive skews 
 
Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, outliers, and independence of 
residuals.   
Statisticians assume that regression variables have a normal distribution (Moore, 
2014).  Non-normally distributed variables (highly skewed or with substantial outliers) 
can distort relationships (McDonald, 2014).  To test for assumptions of normality, 
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McDonald (2014) recommended visual examination of data plots, P-P plots, and 
conducting skewness tests.  According to McDonald, when the data skew is less than -1 
or greater than +1, the distribution is highly skewed and data is not normally distributed.  
In addition, McDonald stated that for a normal distribution, the points on the P-P plot 
should fall close to the diagonal reference line.  In this study, to test the data for 
normality, I conducted a skew test (see Table 5 above) and examined the probability plots 
(P-P) of the standardized residual (see Figure 3).    
The skew test showed that four of the variables had skew scores greater than 1, a 
violation of normality and not suitable for statistical testing (see Table 5).  CEO’s stock 
options had a skew of 5.083, tenure had skew of 1.246, revenues had skew of 3.849, and 
assets had skew of 4.250.  Skewness of data used in CEOs’ studies research was a 
concern noted by other scholars (Moore, 2014; Zondervan, 2015).  In addition, the points 
on probability plots (P-P) did not fall close to the diagonal reference line, indicating a 
violation of normality (Moore, 2014).  However, ROE, ROI and age had small skews of 
between ± 1, and I assumed there was no violation of normality on the variables (see 






Figure 3.  Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression of standardized residuals 
 According to McDonald (2014) one way to fix non-normal distribution is 
through a nonlinear transformation.  For variables with positive skews, McDonald 
recommended applying log transformation on the original variables to reduce the positive 
skew.  Further review on literature revealed that other scholars on CEOs’ compensation 
had performed data transformation on positively skewed data (Antenucci, 2013; 
Zondervan, 2015).  After reviewing the literature, I transformed options, tenure, 
revenues, and assets variables because they had large positive skews (see Table 5).  In 
addition, McDonald stated that the new variables created through transformation improve 
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the fit of a regression model.  I conducted log10 transformation on the options, tenure, 
revenues, and assets, based on their large positive skews; a transformation other 
researchers had used (Antenucci, 2013; Zondervan, 2015).  After conducting log10 
transformations on options, tenure, revenues, and assets, I conducted the skewness test 
and the results indicated that all the variables had small skews of between ± 1, showing 
no violation of normality (see Table 6).  In addition, the probability plots (P-P) showed 
that the points did fall close to the diagonal reference line, and I assumed no violation of 
normality assumptions (see Figure 4).  
Table 6 




N     Skew               S.E 
Options.log 269 -.087 .149 
ROE 269 -.386 .149 
ROI 269 -.197 .149 
Revenues.log 269 .800 .149 
Age 269 .272 .149 
Assets.log 269 .698 .149 
Tenure.log 269 .136 .149 
Valid N  269   






Figure 4.  Normal probability plot (P-P) of the regression of options.log. 
To evaluate independence of residuals, I used the Durbin-Watson test.  The 
Durbin-Watson test ranges from 0 to 4 (Miranda, 2015).  The residuals are uncorrelated 
when the Durbin-Watson test is approximately 2 (Miranda, 2015).  The Durbin-Watson 
statistics score was 1.766, above 1, and below 3, but approximately 2, indicating that the 
data met the assumptions for independence of residuals.  
To test for outliers, I assessed multivariate outliers by examining the Mahalanobis 
distances.  Statisticians apply the Mahalanobis distance on a set of data to find outliers in 
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multiple linear regression models (Moore, 2014).  The Mahalabonis distance showed that 
34 samples had significant p-values of less than 0.05.  Data with a significant 
Mahalanobis distances indicate the presence of outliers (McDonald, 2014).  Elimination 
of these 34 variables was important because they exceeded the allowable values of 
12.159, X² (6, N = 303) = 12.159, p < .05.  
Homoscedasticity is the assumption in which the error term is the same across all 
values of the independent variables (Moore, 2014).  I used a scatterplot to test for 
homoscedasticity of the independent variables (see Figure 5).  Ideally, residuals scattered 
randomly around the horizontal line supports the assumptions of homoscedasticity 
(Kiecolt & Nathan, 2015).  From Figure 5 it seemed reasonable to conclude that residuals 
were homoscedastic.  Linearity is the assumption that the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables are linear (Loe, 2013).  Figure 5 also shows a linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent, and I assumed that the assumption 




Figure 5. Scatterplot of the standardized residuals. 
Descriptive Statistics  
In total, I analyzed 302 CEO’s stock option years.  I eliminated 33 outliers’ 
records, resulting in 269 records for the study analysis.  The average value of options 
given to CEOs’ was 2.90 M, ranging from of 0.10 to 38.60, and standard deviation of 
4.63.  The average value of revenues was 3,209.70, ranging from of 40 to 48,296, and 
standard deviation of 8,704.61.  The descriptive statistics for ROE and ROI are in 
percentages.  The ROE ranged from -67.7% to 81.9%, with an average of 2.92 and a 
standard deviation of 25.32, while ROI ranged from -32.8% to 40% with an average of 
1.91 and a standard deviation of 13.42.  The average value of assets was 6,500.42, 
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ranging from 29.80 to 111,148, with a standard deviation of 18,183.48.  Average age of 
CEOs’ was 56.81 years, ranging from 38 to 79 years, and a standard deviation of 6.56.  
CEOs’ tenure ranged from 1 to 31 years, with an average of 8.01 and standard deviation 
of 6.47.  Table 7 contains descriptive statistics of the study variables. 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
           N        Min            Max M SD 
Options 269 .10 38.60 2.90 4.63 
Revenues 269 40.00 48,296.00 3,209.70 8,704.61 
ROE 269 -67.70 81.90 2.92 25.32 
ROI 269 -32.80 40.00 1.91 13.42 
Assets 269 29.80 111,148.00 6,500.42 18,183.48 
Age 269 38 79 56.81 6.56 
Tenure 269 1 31 8.01 6.47 
 
Inferential Results 
 Hierarchical linear regression, α = .05 (two-tailed), was used to examine the 
ability of ROE, ROI, and annual revenues to predict CEO’s stock options, after 
controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s tenure.  The independent 
variables were ROE, ROI, and annual revenues.  The dependent variable was CEO’s 
stock options.  The null hypothesis was that ROE, ROI, and annual revenues would not 
significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, 
and the CEO’s tenure.  The alternative hypothesis was that ROE, ROI, and annual 
revenues would significantly predict CEO’s stock options, after controlling for firm size, 
age of the CEO and the CEO’s tenure.  Preliminary analyses were conducted to assess 
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whether the assumptions of multicollinearity, outliers, normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, and independence of residuals were met; no serious violations were 
noted.   
Age of CEO, CEO’s tenure, and firm size (control variables) were entered at Step 
1, explaining 32.3% percent of the variance in CEO’s stock options.  In the first model, 
assets and CEO’s tenure were statistically significant with assets (t = 10.302, p < 0.05) 
accounting for a higher contribution to the model than tenure (t = 5.253, p < 0.05).  Age 
did not explain any significant variation in CEO’s stock options.  After entry of the 
predictors (ROE, ROI, and annual revenues) at Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 34.3%, F(6, 262) = 22.792, p < 0.05.  The three predictors 
explained an additional 2.0% of the variance in CEO’s stock options after controlling for 
firm size, age of the CEO, and CEO’s tenure.  In the final model, only firm size and the 
CEO’s tenure were statistically significant.  Table 8 depicts a model summary of the 
regression variables.  The final predictive equation was: 
Log10(options) = b0 + b1(Age) +  b2Log10(Assets) + b3Log10(Tenure) + b4(ROE) + 
b5(ROI) + b6Log10(Revenues).  
 Log10(options) = -.934 + -.007(Age) + 0.502log10(Assets.log) + 0.494log10(Tenure.log) + 









Hierarchical Regression Summary for Variables Predicting CEO’s Stock Options 
Variable B SE Β β R2 ∆R2 
Step 1    .323 .323 
Age of CEO -.008 .004 -.103   
CEO Tenure .528 .100 .280   
Firm Size .341 .033 .523   
Step 2    .343 .020 
Age of CEO -.007 .004 -.096   
CEO Tenure .494 .111 .267   
Firm Size .502 .102 .758   
ROE -.001 .003 -.064   
ROI -.001 .005 -.024   
Annual revenues -.153 .117 -.233   
Note. N = 269 
Assets. The positive slope for assets (10.302) as a predictor of CEO’s stock 
options indicated there was about a 10.302 increase in CEO’s stock options for each one-
point increase in assets. In other words, CEO’s stock options tend to increase as assets 
increases. The squared semi-partial coefficient (sr2) that estimated how much variance in 
CEO’s stock options was uniquely predictable from assets was .535, indicating that 
53.5% of the variance in CEO’s stock options is uniquely accounted for by assets, when 
tenure and age are controlled.  
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Tenure.  The positive slope for tenure (5.253) as a predictor of CEO’s stock 
options indicated there was a 5.253 increase in CEO’s stock options for each additional 
one-unit increase in tenure, controlling for assets and age. In other words, CEO’s stock 
options tend to increase as CEO’s tenure increases. The squared semi-partial coefficient 
(sr2) that estimated how much variance in CEO’s stock options was uniquely predictable 
from tenure was .307, indicating that 30.7% of the variance in CEO’s stock options is 
uniquely accounted for by tenure, when assets and age are controlled.   
Analysis summary 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between ROE, ROI, and 
annual revenues to CEO’s stock options while controlling for firm size, age of the CEO, 
and the CEO’s tenure.  I used hierarchical regression model to examine the ability of 
ROE, ROI, and annual revenues to predict the value of CEO’s stock options.  
Assumptions surrounding multiple regression were assessed with no serious violations 
noted.  The model as a whole was able to significantly predict CEO’s stock options, F(6, 
262) = 22.792, p < 0.05, R2 = .343.  The final model indicated that the three predictors 
explained an additional 2.0% of the variance in CEO’s stock options after controlling for 
32.3% accounted for by the control variables (firm size, age of the CEO, and the CEO’s 
tenure).  However, none of the predictors (ROE, ROI, and annual revenues) provided 
useful predictive information about CEO’s stock options.  The conclusion from this 




  The study result indicated that firm size and CEO’s tenure were significant 
predictors of CEO’s stock options.  Firm size followed by CEO’s tenure explained the 
most of CEO’s stock options.  Research results show that executive compensation and 
firm size are positively correlated (Murphy, 2012).  These results were consistent with 
other studies (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014; Conyon, 2015; Moore, 2014).  
Conyon (2015) noted that the estimated elasticity might be in the range 25% to 45%, 
indicating that firm size is an important predictor of executive pay.  Abraham et al. found 
that firm size and CEO’s tenure explained significantly the CEOs’ compensation.  
According to Abraham et al., larger firms use competitive wages as a means to attract 
talent.  In addition, Abraham et al. noted that, increases in CEOs’ tenure, led to celebrity 
status of the CEO’s and potentially increased compensation.  Other studies results 
showed that CEO’s tenure and firm size played a significant role in CEO’s compensation 
(Mitnick, 2013; Moore, 2014).  CEO’s tenure may lead to entrenchment within a firm 
and support a CEO’s ability to influence the pay package (Moore, 2014).  Therefore, 
when structuring CEO’s compensation, compensation committee should consider factors 
such as firm size and CEO’s tenure that may greatly influence structuring of CEO’s 
compensation.  In structuring CEO’s compensation, compensation committees should 
adopt a balanced approach that incentives stock appreciation, corporate results, and 
retention (Reda & Tonello, 2015). 
Analysis of the data did not reveal the age of the CEOs’ as a significant predictor 
to CEO’s stock options.  In the literature there seems to be conflicting evidence on the 
relationship between age of the CEO and CEO’s compensation.  Moore (2014), found no 
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significant relationship between CEO’s age and CEO’s compensation.  Zondervan (2015) 
examined causality insurance industry and found that age was a significant predictor to 
CEO’s compensation.  Zheng and Zhou (2012 analyzed data on retiring CEOs’ and noted 
that retiring CEOs’ average age was 67.7 years old and had worked with their firm for 
13.4 years.  Although Zheng and Zhou study results showed significant relationship 
between age and tenure, the average age in my study was 57 years, 10 years younger.  I 
therefore believe that a separate study is necessary to examine why literature on 
relationship between CEO’s compensation and age of the CEOs’ is conflicting.  
Data analysis did not reveal annual revenues as significant predictor to CEO’s 
stock options.  The finding on the existing literature is not clear depending on the 
industry under review.  Researchers who have analyzed technology and health industries 
(Reda & Tonello, 2015; Schmutz & Santerre, 2013) found no significant relationship 
between revenues and CEO’s stock options.  On the other hand, researchers who had 
looked at other industries such as insurance, utilities, and financial firms found a 
statistically significant relationship between annual revenues and CEO’s compensation 
(Moore, 2014; Zondervan, 2015).  Increased revenue shows sales of the firms’ products 
and implies superior financial performance (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  
However, in the study there were many firms with lower revenues and high valuations, an 
observation noted on technological firms by other scholars (Abraham, Harris, & 
Auerbach, 2014; Reda & Tonello, 2015).  The pharmaceutical industry is unusual 
because of the larger number of companies with small revenues, significant losses in net 
income, but high market value (Schmutz & Santerre, 2013).  Schmutz and Santerre 
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(2013) explained many of these small pharmaceutical companies with negligible 
revenues but with large market values, and large budgets were likely developing a new 
pharmaceutical product that had not yet reached the market; eventually creating 
shareholders value.  
Abraham et al. (2014) stated that unlike in other sectors where there is high 
correlation between sales and CEOs’ compensation, in technological industries, 
expectation of innovation, research, and development in expectation of future returns 
(future sales and stock price appreciation) contributes to CEOs’ compensation.  
According to Abraham et al., it may be more appropriate to employ revenue growth per 
year as an indicator of both new and existing product performance when analyzing 
technology driven firms.  To tie CEOs’ compensation to shareholders’ value, 
compensation committees should consider other performance measures such as 
benchmarking with other peer-comparison companies (Reda & Tonello, 2015).  
Benchmarking with companies in the same industry and size is likely to offer more 
insights into the relationship between firm performance, CEO’s compensation, and 
reduction of agency costs.    
My findings on the relationship between CEO’s stock options to ROE and ROA 
are similar to those produced by (Angelis & Grinstein, 2015; Moore, 2014; Zondervan, 
2015) who all found no statistically significant relationship between CEOs compensation 
and firm performance.  Given the intense competitiveness and large initial outlay for 
research and development to fund innovation in pharmaceutical companies, and the many 
pharmaceutical firms with lower revenues, it was not surprising that ROE and ROI were 
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not significant predictors of CEO’s stock options.  Angelis and Grinstein (2015) stated 
that technological firms are more likely to grant stock options to their CEO’s even when 
in net losses positions.  Stock options remain central to the toolset used by smaller IT and 
health care companies to attract and retain key talent (Reda & Tonello, 2015).  
In this study, some of the firms that had awarded their CEOs’ millions in stock 
options had net losses in net income.  This might explain why ROE and ROI had no 
significant statistical relationship to CEO’s stock options.  CEO’s of these companies 
received compensation even when the performance of their firms was not observable 
(Schmutz & Santerre, 2013).  Moore (2014) analyzed insurance companies, while 
controlling for firm size, age of CEO, and CEO’s tenure, and found that ROE had no 
significant relationship to CEO’s compensation.  CEOs’ who position their firms to 
create disruptive technology that sustains competitive advantage benefit from higher 
stock options grants (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  When structuring CEOs’ 
stock options compensation, compensation committee need to consider other factors such 
as sales growth, investments in research and development, and how the CEO has driven 
competitive advantage from innovation than only examining short term measures such as 
annual revenues.  In addition, for effective business practice, stock options remain central 
for smaller and innovative companies to attract and retain key talent.    
Applications to Professional Practice 
The purpose of this study was to examine one component of CEOs’ compensation 
(stock options) to firm performance within a single industry.  The findings of the study 
did not support the agency theory with respect to awarding CEO’s stock options based on 
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firm performance.  Equity compensation, is proposed as an efficient mechanism to align 
managers and shareholders’ interests and has received a lot of scrutiny from regulators 
and shareholders (Khalid and Rehman, 2014; Murphy 2012).  However, the 
pharmaceutical industry is unique, in that there are many firms with lower revenues and 
high valuations (Schmutz & Santerre, 2013).   
Industries may have specific characteristics that affect the variation in CEO’s 
compensation and compensation committees need to be aware of these unique industry 
characteristics (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  For firms that are unique, Reda 
and Tonello (2015) recommended compensation benchmarking as more appropriate.  
According to Reda and Tonello (2015) most firms are already benchmarking with 
industry and company size as the most used criteria for the peer-comparison group.  
Therefore, business leaders serving in companies that are innovation driven could 
consider benchmarking with other companies in the same industry and size.  Most 
biotech companies in the research phase have high valuations and no revenues, and 
comparison with other companies in the same business cycle is more helpful when 
designing CEOs’ compensation and reducing agency costs.         
Reda and Tonello (2015) analyzed CEOs’ compensation across all industries and 
noted that growth companies in the information technology and health care sectors were 
the only subset that continued to rely extensively on stock options.  The pharmaceutical 
industry is technology driven, and compensation committees along with investment 
managers should consider evaluating whether performance parameters such as net 
income and revenues are appropriate for firms investing heavily in R&D for future 
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benefits.  Performance measures such as revenues, ROI and ROE are short-term 
measures, but drug development process is time consuming and expensive.  Brown 
(2013) noted that in the pharmaceutical industry it could take years before realizing the 
full risks or benefits.  However, Reda and Tonello (2015) noted that most firms were 
adopting capital efficiency measures to evaluate the CEO’s performance.  When 
evaluating CEO’s performance, business leaders could use measures other long-term 
performance measures such as percent change in earnings per share, long-term use of 
debt, and improved funding sources (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  For 
improved business practice, looking at firm performance with a long-term view aligns 
with the long-term nature of research undertaken by pharmaceutical firms.       
Implications for Social Change 
The rise in executive compensation contributes to the skewing of income 
distribution in the United States (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014).  Implications for positive 
social change include the potential for policy makers to address societal concerns on 
widening income inequality due to increasing concentration of wealth at the top, to high-
earning salaried workers.  People in the society believe that there is unfair distribution of 
valuable resources such as income (Kiatpongsan & Norton, 2014).  Therefore, 
understanding the widening income gap, and the consequences of income inequality such 
as feelings of unfairness in the society, are some of the implications of this study.  
Furthermore, firms compensating their CEOs’ based on performance are more likely to 
invest more on R&D, leading to innovation, increased employment opportunities leading 
to increased economic growth (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014). 
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Recommendations for Action 
The intent of this study was to analyze the relationship between firm performance 
and CEOs’ stock options.  I will share the results, publication, and presentation of this 
study at professional workshops or conferences.  I will publish this study in the 
ProQuest/UMI database.  The results of this study are potentially beneficial to select 
audiences if disseminated appropriately.  Three primary benefactors of this study would 
be compensation committees, scholars, and investors.  While none of the predictors was 
significantly significant in predicting CEOs’ compensation, compensation committees 
could evaluate how firm performance parameters relate to the industry they serve.  In 
making investment decisions, investors should consider performance parameters based on 
the industry specific characteristics and industry cycle (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 
2014).  Investing in industries that are technologically driven is likely to require long-
term analysis of performance that aligns with the long-term nature of R&D investments, 
which would improve competitive edge (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  
Knowing that each industry is unique opens a door for future research, to evaluate 
how each component of executive compensation benefits the shareholders.  In addition, 
other variables such as firm size and CEO’s tenure explained most of CEO’s stock 
options.  Conyon 2015 noted that when firm size was controlled, some performance 
variables such as CEO’s talent lost their positive correlation to CEO’s compensation.  For 
improved business practice, compensation committees, business leaders, and investors 
need to evaluate whether other strategies provide better results in explaining CEO’s stock 
options compensation.   
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For scholars, there is need to expand research to further analyze CEO’s pay 
differently based on the industry they (CEOs’) serve.  Contemplating different 
performance parameters that aligns with industry competitiveness and technological 
strategies is important.  When compensation researchers create an omnibus sample of 
industries, firm level effects between high technology firms and less technology-driven 
firms maybe negated (Abraham, Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  To sustain innovation and 
gain competitive advantage, technology driven companies must invest significantly in 
R&D.  Therefore using traditionally commonly used performance parameters such as 
revenues, net income, etc. without considering other factors such as product development 
cycle and R&D expenditures may drive the wrong study conclusions.  Confining a study 
to a single industry is useful in isolating practices, smoothened out in multi-industry 
study (Abraham et al., 2014).  Analyzing CEO’s compensation as a whole package, 
without considering the different components (salary, bonus, stock options etc.) might not 
help in addressing how these components benefit the shareholders.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
Future studies could examine other components of CEO’s compensation structure 
to firm performance.  In this study, I analyzed only one component of CEO’s 
compensation; stock options, but other components such as bonus, stock awards, cash etc. 
might offer more insights into the CEO’s compensation.  In addition, instead of 
examining the whole pharmaceutical industry, researchers could focus on firms 
categorized into different indexes such as S&P 500 (large companies), S&P Midcap 400 
(mid-sized companies), and S&P 600 (small-sized companies), as each segments is 
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driven by different business dynamics.  Further research, could involve investigating 
different performance variables that are more suitable for technology driven industries, 
than using commonly used variables, which might not be relevant to the industry under 
review.  Performance variables that align with the long-term nature of R&D in the 
pharmaceutical industry would be more appropriate to gauge firm performance.   
Reflections 
  The research process was a humbling, yet exciting experience.  The 
doctorate experience was at times overwhelming, because of the size and complexity of 
writing at a doctoral level.  As I continued to immerse myself into the doctorate journey, I 
leaned to take criticism positively, and to get the most out of my classmates, committee 
members and the other resources at my disposal.  Above all, I honed my organization and 
time management skill in order to accommodate the rigor of a doctorate study.  I intend 
to reach out to other doctoral students to share my experiences, especially using online 
resources for maximum benefits.  
 By reviewing pharmaceutical industry, an industry that I have spent a 
considerable time of my career in, I have learned a lot about the industry’s CEOs’ 
compensation, information that I could share with my managers to help in understanding 
how stock options relate to the industry.  I hope that my research will support decision 
makers in the pharmaceutical industry to better understand how executive compensation 
relates to firm performance.   
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Summary and Study Conclusions 
Previous researchers have examined the relationship between CEO’s 
compensation and firm performance (Moore, 2014; Sigler, 2003; Zondervan, 2015), but 
few have focused on the pharmaceutical industry.  Linking CEO’s compensation to firm 
performance is an important consideration of agency theory (Moore, 2014).  The agent 
(CEO’s) may have interests that differ with those of the principal (shareholders’) of the 
firm (Akinloye, 2012).  To link the agent and the principal interests, equity 
compensations, should include both the interests of the CEO’s and the shareholders’ 
(Essid, 2012).  However, how effective the use of equity compensation is in reducing 
agency costs is not clear (Essid, 2012).   
The research question addressed the association among ROE, ROI, and annual 
revenues to CEO’s stock options in the pharmaceutical industry.  Using a hierarchical 
regression, I examined how firm performance (ROI, ROE, and revenues) related to 
CEO’s stock options.  None of the three predictors was statistically significant in 
predicting CEO’s stock options.  Whether CEO’s stock options reduces agency theory is 
not clear.  Canyon (2015) stated that firms frequently grant options that do not link to 
firm performance but instead allow managers to reap windfall gains from stock price 
increases that are due solely to the market and sector within which the firms operate.   
Reda and Tonello (2015 noted that between 2010 and 2014, CEOs’ compensation 
in the health care sector surged with the stock options weighing significantly more on 
total pay.  It was however clear that firms justify using stock options to attract and retain 
talent, more so in the technology driven industries.  Pharmaceutical firms need to produce 
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a steam of innovations in order to survive in a competitive environment (Abraham, 
Harris, & Auerbach, 2014).  Using short-term performance parameters such as net 
income and revenues to evaluate an R&D intensive industry might not help in 
understanding how CEOs’ compensation relates to shareholders’ value.  Other measures 
such as cash flow, net present value, funding sources, changes in revenues, and internal 
rate of return are among the performance metric that could be evaluate when analyzing 




Abels, P., & Martelli, J. (2013). CEO duality: How many hats are too many? Corporate 
Governance, 13, 135-147. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14720701311316625 
Abraham, R., Harris, J., & Auerbach, J. (2014). CEO pay-performance sensitivity: A 
multi-equation model. Technology and Investment, 5, 125-136. 
http://dx.doi.org/doi.org/10.4236/ti.2014.53013 
Akinloye, A. (2012). The relationship between executive pay and alternative earnings 
measure. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 16(4), 41-59. 
Retrieved from http://www.alliedacademies.org/public/journals/JournalDetails 
Akinloye, A., & Hussein, W. (2012). The impact of stock options compensation. 
Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 16, 35-77. Retrieved from 
http://www.alliedacademies.org 
Alghalith, M., Floros, C., & Dukharan, M. (2012). Testing dominant theories and 
assumptions in behavioral finance. The Journal of Risk Finance, 13, 262-268. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/15265941211229262 
Allwood, C. (2011). The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods is problematic. Quality & Quantity, 46, 1417-1429. http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1007/s11135-011-9455-8 
Alrafadi, K., & Md-Yusuf, M. (2014). Evaluating the performance of Libyan banks using 
return on investment. American Journal of Economics and Business 
Administration, 5(5), 84-88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3844/ajebasp.2013.84.88 
Álvarez-Pérez, D., & Neira-Fontela, E. (2013). Corporate governance, uncertainty and 
107 
 
executive stock option plans. Management Revue, 24, 250-269. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1688/1861-9908 
Antenucci, R. (2013). Impact of corporate governance, excess CEO compensation, and 
CEO stock option grants on firm performance during recessionary periods. 
Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities and Social Sciences, 
76(04(E). (UMI No. 3618935) 
Arbogast, C., & Mirabella, J. (2014). Predicting firm performance as a function of CEO 
and economic factors. The Journal of American Academy of Business, 19(2), 96-
102. Retrieved from http://www.jaabc.com/journal.htm 
Armstrong, C., & Vashishtha, R. (2012). Executive stock options, differential risk-taking 
incentives, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 70-88. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.11.005 
Aussems, M., Boomsma, A., & Snijders, T. (2009). The use of quasi-experiments in the 
social sciences: a content analysis. Quality & Quantity, 45, 21-42. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-009-9281-4 
Ayiro, L. P. (2012). A functional approach to educational research methods and 
statistics: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. Lewiston, 
NY: Edwin Mellen Press. 
Bahloul, W., Hachicha, N., & Bouri, A. (2013). Modeling the effect of CEO power on 
efficiency: Evidence from the European non-life insurance market. Journal of 
Risk Finance, 14, 266-285. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JRF-11-2012-0077 




Bali, T., Brown, S., & Caglayan, M. (2011). Do hedge funds’ exposures to risk factors 
predict their future returns? Journal of Financial Economics, 101, 36-68. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.008 
Banker, R., Darrough, M., Huang, R., & Plehn, J. (2013). The relation between CEO 
compensation and past performance. The Accounting Review, 88, 1-30. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50274 
Baum, C., Ford, W., & Zhao, K. (2012). Top five executives’ share of core earnings. 
Journal of Financial and Economic Practice, 12(2), 88-101. Retrieved from 
http://www.bradley.edu/academic/departments/finance 
Bebchuk, L., Cremers, K., & Peyer, U. (2012). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 102, 199-221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.006 
Benke, G. (2014). From green fields to narrating nothingness: Neoliberal logic and the 
move away from environmental responsibility in Enron’s rhetoric and visual 
style. American Studies, 53(2), 71-94. Retrieved from http://www.asjournal.org 
Bergman, M. (2011). The politics, fashions, and conventions of research methods. 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 5, 99-102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 
1558689811408318 
Bihari, S. (2014). Intrinsic value of stocks: Does market appreciate it? A study on three 
major private banks in India. Economics, Management, and Financial Markets, 
9(1), 53-74. Retrieved from ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals 
Bozec, R., & Dia, M. (2015). Governance practices and firm performance: Does 
109 
 
shareholders’ proximity to management matter. International Journal of 
Disclosure and Governance, 12, 185-209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2014.3 
Brown, A. (2013). Understanding pharmaceutical research manipulation in the context of 
accounting manipulation. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 41, 611-619, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jlme.12070 
Burrill, G. (2014). Pharmaceutical companies, faced with growing pricing pressures, 
should look outside their products for new revenue opportunities. Journal of 
Commercial Biotechnology, 19, 3-5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5912/jcb.608 
Cheikh, S. (2014). Determinants of CEO power and characteristics of managerial profile: 
Implications for risk-taking in listed Tunisian firms. International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 6, 140-152. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v6n6p140 
Cheng, H., Venezia, C., & Lou, Y. (2013). Determinants of chief executive officer. The 
International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 7(4), 29-43. Retrieved 
from http://www.theibfr.com/ijbfr.htm 
Clay, J. G. (2014). Examining the correlation between social media and student retention. 
Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities and Social Sciences, 
76(01(E). (UMI No. 3634803) 
Coffie, M. (2013). The impact of social venture capital and social entrepreneurship on 
poverty reduction. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities 
and Social Sciences, 74(07(E). (UMI No. 3556987) 
Converse, M. (2012). Philosophy of phenomenology: How understanding aids research. 
Nurse Researcher, 20(1), 28-32. doi:10.7748/nr2012.09.20.1.28.c9305 
110 
 
Conyon, M. (2015). Executive compensation and board governance in US firms. 
Economic Journal, 124(574), 60-90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12120 
Cooper, B. (2012). Challenging the qualitative-quantitative divide: Explorations in case-
focused causal analysis. London, England: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2013). Business research methods (12th ed.). New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Cuevas, G., Gomez, L., & Wiseman, R. (2012). Has agency theory run its course? 
Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of reward systems. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20, 526-546. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1111/corg.12004 
Curtis, E., & Drennan, J. (2013). Quantitative health research: Issues and methods. 
Maidenhead, England: McGraw-Hill Education. 
Damien, P. (2013). Bayesian theory and applications. Oxford, England: OUP Premium. 
Daniel, K., & Amos, T. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292. Retrieved from https://www. 
econometricsociety.org 
Davis, C. (2013). SPSS for applied sciences: Basic statistical testing. Collingwood, Vic: 
CSIRO. 
Denning, S. (2013). Why stock-based compensation poisons leadership. Strategy & 
Leadership, 41(1), 15-17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/10878571311290025 
Dicks, D. (2012). Executive compensation and the role for corporate governance 




Dogan, M., Elitas, B., Agca, V., & Ogel, S. (2013). The impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance: Evidence from Turkey. International Journal of Business and 
Social Science, 4(2), 149-156. Retrieved from http://www.ijbssnet.com/ 
Economic Institute Policy. (2014, July). CEO pay continues to rise as typical workers are 
paid less. Retrieved from http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-
rise/ 
EDGAR Online. (2014, June 13). Filings & forms. Retrieved from http://www.sec.gov/ 
edgar.shtml 
Edmonds, C., Leece, R., & Maher, J. (2012). CEO bonus compensation: The effects of 
missing analysts’ revenue forecasts. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 41, 149-170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-012-0305-0 
Eklund, J., & Palmberg, J. (2013). Inherited corporate control and returns on investment. 
Small Bus Econ, 41, 419-431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11187-012-9432-1 
Essid, W. (2012). Executive stock options and earnings management: Is there an option 
level dependence? Corporate Governance, 12, 54-70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ 
14720701211191337 
Ettredge, M., Schliz, S., Smith, K., & Sun, L. (2010). How do restatements begin? 
Evidence of earnings management preceding restated financial reports. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 37, 332-355. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5957.2010.02199.x 
Exner, N. (2014). Research information literacy: Addressing original researchers’ needs. 
112 
 
The Journal of Academic Librarianship, 3, 10-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.acalib.2014.06.006 
Fathi, S., Zarei, F., & Esfahani, S. (2012). Studying the role of financial risk management 
on return on equity. International Journal of Business and Management, 7, 215-
222. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v7n9p215 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Bunchner, A., & Lang, A. (2009). Statistical power analyses using 
G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research 
Methods, 39(2), 175-191. Retrieved from http://gpower.hhu.de/ 
Fienberg, S., Martin, M., & Straf, M. (1985). Sharing research data. Washington, D.C: 
National Academies Press. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. (2014). Summary of statement No. 123 (Revised 
2004). Norwalk, CT. Retrieved from http://www.fasb.org/summary/ 
stsum123r.shtml 
Frels, R., & Onwuegbuzie, A. (2013). Administering quantitative instruments with 
qualitative interviews: A mixed research approach. Journal of Counseling & 
Development, 91, 184-194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.2013.00085.x 
Frydenberg, E., & Reevy, G. (2015). Personality, stress, and coping: Implications for 
education. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing. 
Frydman, C., & Saks, R. (2010). Executive compensation: A new view from a long-term 
perspective, 1936-2005. Review of Financial Studies, 23, 2099-2138. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp120 
Gaver, J., & Im, S. (2014). Funding sources and excess CEO compensation in not-for-
113 
 
profit organizations. Accounting Horizons, 28, 1-16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/ 
acch-50588 
Gerard, J. (2014). How agency theory informs a $30 million fraud. Journal of Finance, 
Accounting and Management, 5(1), 16-47. Retrieved from http://www.na-
businesspress.com/jafopen.html 
Glynn, D., & Robinson, J. (2014). Corpus methods for semantics: Quantitative studies in 
polysemy and synonymy. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 
Gong, J. (2011). Examining shareholder value creation over CEO tenure: A new 
approach to testing effectiveness of executive compensation. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 23, 1-28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-
10105 
Gong, J., & Li, S. (2012). CEO incentives and earnings prediction. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 40, 647-679. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/ 
s11156-012-0291-2 
Gopalan, R., Milbourn, T., Song, F., & Thakor, A. V. (2014). Duration of executive 
compensation. The Journal of Finance, 69, 2777-2817. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ 
jofi.12085  
Guthrie, K., Sokolowsky, J., & Wan, K.-M. (2012). CEO compensation and board 




Hagan, T. (2014). Measurements in quantitative research: How to select and report on 
research instruments. Oncology Nursing Forum, 41, 431-433. Retrieved from 
https://www.ons.org 
Hall, B. J., & Kelvin, M. J. (2003). The trouble with stock options. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 38(3), 1-41. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/ 
Hannes, S., & Tabbach, A. (2013). Executive stock options: The effects of manipulation 
on risk taking. Journal of Corporation Law, 38, 533-536. Retrieved from 
http://jcl.law.uiowa.edu/  
Hayes, R., Lemmon, M., & Qui, M. (2012). Stock options and managerial incentives for 
risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R. Journal of Financial Economics, 105, 174-
190. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.004 
Heiens, R., McGrath, L., & Leach, R. (2008). The impact of intangible assets and 
expenditures on holding period returns in the pharmaceutical industry. Journal of 
Medical Marketing, 8, 151-158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jmm.5050131 
Heughebaert, A., & Manugart, S. (2012). Firm valuation in venture capital financing 
rounds: The role of investor bargaining power. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 39, 500-530. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2012.02284.x 
Hobart, J., Cano, S., Baron, R., Thompson, A., Schwid, S., Zajicek, J., & Andrich, D. 
(2013). Achieving valid patient-reported outcomes measurement: A lesson from 
fatigue in multiple sclerosis. Multiple Sclerosis Journal, 19, 41-72. http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1177/1352458513483378 
Huang, Y., Haung, C., & Li, X. (2011). Fighting for control power of GOME Inc.: A case 
115 
 
study. Journal of Business Case Studies, 7(6), 23-39. Retrieved from 
http://www.GOME.com.hk/milestone 
Hyunju, S. (2013). The effect of implicit service guarantees on business performance. 
The Journal of Services Marketing, 27, 431-442. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JSM-
02-2012-0037 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). (2014). Topic 427 - Stock options. Washington, DC. 
Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc427.html 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Retrieved from http://jfe.rochester.edu/  
Jesus, S., & Emma, G. (2013). Does corporate governance influence earnings 
management in Latin American markets? Journal of Business Ethics, 121, 419-
440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1700-8 
Jha, R., Kobelsky, K., & Lim, J. (2013). The impact of performance-based CEO and CFO 
compensation on internal control quality. Journal of Applied Business Research, 
29, 913-933. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12018 
Jiraporn, P., Chintrkarn, P., & Liu, Y. (2011). Capital structure, CEO dominance, and 
corporate performance. Journal of Financial Services Research, 42, 139-158. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-011-0109-8 
Joanne, R. (2012). Learning zone. Nursing Standard / RCN Publishing, 27(15), 52-59. 
Retrieved from http://www.rcnpublishing.com 
Jones, D., & Smith, K. (2012). Employee stock options: A standard setting saga. Journal 
116 
 
of Business Case Studies, 8, 241-261. Retrieved from http://www.aabri. 
com/jbca.html 
Jouber, J., & Fakhfakh, H. (2012). Pay for luck: New evidences from the institutional 
determinants of CEOs’ compensation. International Journal of Law and 
Management, 54, 485-507. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17542431211281963 
Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., & Mathieu, R. (2012). CEO stock options and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and bias. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 83, 
299-322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-011-0229-0 
Kar, N. (2011). Ethics in research. The Odisha Journal of Psychiatry, 24(7), 23-28. 
Retrieved from http://www.orissajp.com/ 
Khalid, S., & Rehman, M. (2014). Impact of directors’ remuneration on financial 
performance of a firm. International Journal of Information, Business and 
Management, 6(1), 180-197. Retrieved from http://www.ijibm.elitehall.com 
Kiatpongsan, S., & Norton, M. (2014). How much (more) should CEOs make? A 
universal desire for more equal pay. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9(6), 
578-593. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745691614549773 
Kiecolt, K., & Nathan, L. (2015). Secondary analysis of survey data. Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage. 
Kile, C., & Phillips, M. (2009). Using industry classification codes to sample high-
technology firms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 24(1), 35-58. 
Retrieved from http://www.jaf.sagepub.com 
King, G. (2013). Restructuring the social sciences: Reflections from Harvard’s institute 
117 
 
for quantitative social science. Political Science & Politics, 47, 165-172. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096513001534 
Klimberg, R., & McCullough, B. (2013). Fundamentals of predictive analytics with JMP. 
Cary, NC: SAS Institute. 
Koku, P. (2011). On the connection between R&D, selling expenditures, and profitability 
in the pharmaceutical industry revisited. Journal of Strategic Marketing, 19, 273-
283. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0965254X.2011.581380 
Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. (2013). CEO duality: A review and research 
agenda. Journal of Management, 40, 256-286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 
0149206313503013 
Leedy, P., & Ormrod, J. (2013). Practical research: Planning and design (10th ed.). 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. 
LexisNexis Academic. (2015, June 11). Create a company list. Retrieved from 
http://www.lexisnexis.com  
Lin, D., & Lin, L. (2014). The interplay between director compensation and CEO 
compensation. The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 8(2), 
11-27. Retrieved from http://www.theibfr.com/ijbfr.htm 




Liu, Y., Mauer, D., & Zhang, Y. (2014). Firm cash holdings and CEO inside debt. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 42(C), 83-100. Retrieved from http://econpapers. 
repec.org/article/eeejbfina/  
Martin, E., Meehan, T., & Schackman, B. (2013). AIDS drug assistance programs: 
Managers confront uncertainty and need to adapt as the affordable care act kicks 
in. Health affairs, 32, 1063-1071. http://dx.doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2012.0123 
Martin, G., Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. (2012). Executive stock options as mixed 
gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model. Academy of Management 
Journal, 56, 451-472. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.0967 
Martinez, G. (2014). A predictive analysis of organization identification and citizenship 
behavior on employee motivation. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section 
A. Humanities and Social Sciences, 75(08(E)). (UMI No. 3617331) 
McClelland, P., Barker, V., & Oh, W. (2012). CEO career horizon and tenure: Future 
performance implications under different contingencies. Journal of Business 
Research, 65, 1387-1393. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.09.003 
McDonald, J.H. 2014. Handbook of Biological Statistics (3rd ed.). Sparky House 
Publishing, Baltimore, Maryland 
Miles, P., & Miles, G. (2013). Corporate social responsibility and executive 
compensation: exploring the link. Social Responsibility Journal, 9(1), 76-90. 
http://dx.doi.org/:10.1108/17471111311307822 
Michell, J. (2012). Qualitative research meets the ghost of Pythagoras. Theory & 
Psychology, 21, 241-259. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354310391351 
119 
 
Miller, D., Sarsdais, C., & Case, T. (2012). Angel agents: Agency theory reconsidered. 
Academy of Management Perspectives, 6(2), 6-14. Retrieved from aom.org/AMP 
Mitnick, B. (2013). Origin of the theory of agency: An account by one of the theory’s 
originators. American Economic Review, 2-16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.1020378 
Mitra, S., Hossain, M., & Marks, B. (2012). Corporate ownership characteristics and 
timeliness of remediation of internal control weaknesses. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 27, 846-877. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686901211263076 
Miranda, U. (2015). The relationship between terrorism, oil prices, and airline 
profitability (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and 
Theses database. (UMI No. 3688612) 
Moore, G. (2014). Relationship between chief executive officer compensation and firm 
performance for U.S. health insurance companies. Dissertation Abstracts 
International: Section A. Humanities and Social Sciences, 75(08(E)). (UMI No. 
3617632) 
Moscu, R. (2013). Does CEO duality really affect corporate performance? International 
Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Sciences, 2(1), 
156-167. Retrieved from http://www.hrmars.com 
Murphy, K., & Trefftzs, K. (2012). Executive compensation: Where we are, and how we 




Murray, G., Rugeley, C., Mitchell, D., & Mondok, J. (2013). Convenient yet not a 
convenience sample: Jury pools as experimental subject pools. Social Science 
Research, 42, 246-253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.06.002 
Nakhaei, H. (2012). Evaluation of company performance with accounting and economic 
criteria in bursa Malaysia. Journal of Global Business and Economics, 6(1), 49-
63. Retrieved from http://www.aripd.org/jibe 
Nancy, M., & Fall, A. (2012). The effect of SFAS No. 123(R) on executive incentive 
pay. International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, 20, 282-
299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/18347641211245164 
Nandi, K. (2012). Performance measures: An application of value added statement. The 
IUP Journal of Operations Management, 5(3), 39-62. Retrieved from 
http://www.iupindia.in/Operations_Management 
Nyoamong, E., & Temesgen, K. (2013). The effect of governance on performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya: A panel study. Corporate Governance, 13, 236-248. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/CG-12-2010-0107 
NYSE. (2014, June 24). Corporate responsibility manual. New York, NY. Retrieved 
from http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/ 
Oberholzers, M., & Theusissen, M. (2012). Benchmarking of Johannesburg stock 
exchange CEO compensation. International Business & Economics Research 
Journal, 11, 1061-1077. Retrieved from http://www.iabe.org/domains/iabeX/ 
journalinfo.aspx?JournalID=JIBE  
Offstein, E., & Gnyawali, D. (2005). CEO compensation and firm competitive behavior: 
121 
 
Empirical evidence from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management, 22, 201-225. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jengtecman.2005.06.004 
Ozkan, N. (2011). CEO compensation and firm performance: An empirical investigation 
of UK panel data. European Financial Management, 17, 260-285. http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1111/j.1468-036X.2009.00511.x 
Pandher, G., & Currie, R. (2013). CEO compensation: A resource advantage and 
stakeholder-bargaining perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 22-41. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.1995 
Paz, V. (2012). The impact of stock option expensing as part of CEO compensation and 
earnings quality. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section A. Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 74(02(E)). (UMI No. 3539481) 
Paz, V., & Griffin, T. (2014). Granting stock options as part of CEO compensation and 
the impact on earnings quality. Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, 6(1), 31-
47. Retrieved from http://www.jmrpublication.org 
Peer, W., Zyngier, S., & Hakemulder, F. (2012). Scientific methods for the humanities. 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Peterson, K. (2011). Accounting complexity, misreporting, and the consequences of 
misreporting. Review of Accounting Studies, 17, 72-95. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1007/s11142-011-9164-5 
Pham, A. (2015). CEO duality and performance of not-for-profit hospitals. Dissertation 




Pirvu, T., & Schulze, K. (2012). Multi-stock portfolio optimization under prospect 
theory. Mathematics and Financial Economics, 4, 337-362. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1007/s11579-012-0079-0 
Prajapati, V., & Dureja, H. (2012). Product lifecycle management in pharmaceuticals. 
Journal of Medical Marketing: Device, Diagnostic and Pharmaceutical 
Marketing, 12, 150-158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1745790412445292 
Raelin, J., & Bondy, K. (2013). Putting the good back in good corporate governance: The 
presence and problems of double-layered agency theory. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 21, 420-435. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12038 
Rashid, A. (2013). Corporate governance, executive pay and firm performance: Evidence 
from Bangladesh. International Journal of Management, 30, 556-576. Retrieved 
from http://www.ijmess.com 
Reda, J., & Tonello, M. (2015, August 25). The conference board CEO and executive 
compensation practices 2015 edition key findings. The Conference Board. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2702563 
Regression with SPSS. (2014, January 1). Regression with SPSS: Lesson 2. Retrieved 
from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/webbooks/reg/chapter2/spssreg2.htm 
 
Riachi, I., & Schwienbacher, A. (2013). Securitization of corporate assets and executive 




Roach, G. (2003). Pharmaceutical industry. Compensation & Benefits Review, 4, 1-17. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886368703257042 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic the theory of agency: Principal’s problem. The 
American Economic Review, 3(6), 125-138. Retrieved from https://www.aeaweb. 
org/aea_journals.php 
Ryan, R., Whitler, K., & Semadeni, M. (2014). Power to the principals! An experimental 
look at shareholder say-on-pay voting. Academy of Management Journal, 57(1), 
94-115. Retrieved from http://amj.aom.org/ 
Sania, K., & Mobeen, R. (2014). Impact of directors’ remuneration on financial 
performance of a firm. International Journal of Information, Business and 
Management, 6(1), 180-197. Retrieved from http://www.ijibm.elitehall.com 
Sanz, L., & Nicol, J. (2014). Financial decision-making in a high-growth company: The 
case of Apple incorporated. Management Decision, 52, 1591-1610. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/MD-10-2013-0557 
Schmutz, B., & Santerre, R. (2013). Examining the link between cash flow, market value, 
and research and development investment spending in the medical device 
industry. Health Economics, 22(2), 157-167. Retrieved from http://www. 
healtheconomics.com 
Schneider, G. (1951). Taxation - employee stock options under the Revenue Act of 1950. 
Marquette Law Review, 34(3), 211-215. Retrieved from http://www.law. 
marquette.edu 
Schrader, R., & Toner, J. (2013). Revenue recognition under convergence: Strategic 
124 
 
implications for time value of money in reported income. Journal of American 
Academy of Business, Cambridge, 19(1), 235-241. Retrieved from http://www. 
jaabc.com/journal.htm 
S&P Capital IQ. (2014, May 14). Corporation records. New York, NY. Retrieved from 
https://www.netadvantage.standardandpoors.com/ 
S&P Capital IQ. (2015, June 14). Corporation records. New York, NY. Retrieved from 
https://www.netadvantage.standardandpoors.com/  
Sheikh, S. (2012). Do CEO compensation incentives affect firm innovation? Review of 
Accounting and Finance, 11, 4-39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14757701211201803 
Sigler, K. (2003). CEO compensation and healthcare organization performance. 
Management Research News, 26, 31-38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ 
01409170310783510 
Sigler, K. (2011). CEO compensation and company performance. Business and 
Economics Journal, 20(11), 1-8. Retrieved from http://www.astonjournals. 
com/bej.htm 
Spector, B., & Spital, F. (2011). The ideology of executive bonuses: A historical 
perspective. Journal of Management History, 17, 315-331. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1108/17511341111141387 
Srivastava, A. (2013). Do CEOs possess any extraordinary ability? Can those abilities 
justify large CEO pay? Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 20, 349-361. 
Retrieved from https://www.editorialmanager.com/apjm 




Sun, F., Wei, X., & Huang, X. (2013). CEO compensation and firm performance: 
Evidence from the US property and liability insurance industry. Review of 
Accounting and Finance, 12, 252-267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/RAF-Jan-2012-
0006 
Sun, J., & Cahan, S. (2012). The economic determinants of compensation committee 
quality. Managerial Finance, 38, 188-205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ 
03074351211193721 
Syriopoulos, T., & Tsatsaronis, M. (2012). Corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance: CEO duality in shipping firms. Eurasian Business Review, 
2, 1-30. http://dx.doi.org/10.14208/BF03353805  
Tabachnick, B., & Fidell, L. (2012). Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). Boston, MA: 
Pearson Education.  
Tang, H. (2013). Are CEO stock option grants optimal? Evidence from family firms and 
non-family firms around the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting, 42(2), 251-292. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11156-012-0341-9 
Tangjitprom, N. (2013). Earnings management and corporate governance in Thailand. 
National Institute of Development Administration & Assumption University 
Bangkok, Thailand, 61(9), 41-46. http://dx.doi.org/10.7763/IPEDR.2013 
Teo, T. (2013). Handbook of quantitative methods for educational research. Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands: Sense Publishers. 
The Affordable Care Act. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.medicaid.gov  
126 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research (2015). The problem with stock options. 
Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/digest/mar04/w9784.html 
Thomson, A. (2013). Regulation of research on human subjects: Academic freedom and 
the institutional review board. Academe, 99(4), 101-117. Retrieved from 
http://www.aaup.org 
Tien, C., & Chen, C. (2012). Myth or reality? Assessing the moderating role of CEO 
compensation on the momentum of innovation in R&D. The International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 23, 2763-2784. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1080/09585192.2011.637059 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative 
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 279-323. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574  
Tzu-Ching, W., Chia-Hsuan, T., & Chun-Ho, C. (2014). Equity-based executive 
compensation, managerial legal liability coverage and earnings management. 
Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, 4, 167-193. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.1781743 
U.S. Census Bureau. (2012). 2012 NAICS definition: 325412: Pharmaceutical 
preparation manufacturing. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.census. 
gov/eos/www/naics/index.html  
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2012). Drug pricing: Research on 




U.S Government Accountability Office. (2014). Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://www.gao.gov  
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2013). Researching public companies 
through EDGAR: A guide for investors. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
http://www.sec.org 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). (2014). The role of the SEC. 
Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.sec.org 
Verma, V. (2014). Sampling for household-based surveys of child labour. Geneva, 
Switzerland: ILO. 
Walter, J. (2012). The influence of firm and industry characteristics on returns from 
technology licensing deals: Evidence from the US computer and pharmaceutical 
sectors. R&D Management, 42, 435-454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9310.2012.00693 
Wang, H., Venezia, C., & Lou, Y. (2013). Determinants of chief executive officer. The 
International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 7(4), 29-43. Retrieved 
from http://www.theibfr.com/ijbfr.htm 
Wao, H., Mhaskar, R., Kumar, A., Miladinovic, B., Guterbock, T., Hozo, I., Djulbegovic, 
B. (2014). Uncertainty about effects is a key factor influencing institutional 




Wasiuzzaman, S., Sahafzadeh, I., & Najad, N. (2015). Prospect theory, industry 
characteristics and earnings management: A study of Malaysian industries. 
Review of Accounting and Finance, 25, 210-238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/RAF-
11-2013-0127 
Westerman, M. (2012). Conversation analysis and interpretive quantitative research on 
psychotherapy process and problematic interpersonal behavior. Theory & 
Psychology, 21, 155-178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354310394719 
Wu, M., Liao, S., & Huang, Y. (2013). Determinants of the adoption of executive stock 
options in China. Chinese Economy, 46, 63-84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/ 
CES1097-1475460404 
Xu, X., & Yuen, W. (2014). Applications and implementations of continuous robust 
designs. Communications in statistics. Theory & Methods, 40, 26-35 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03610920903511769 
Yan, L., & Liyan, Y. (2013). Prospect theory, the disposition effect, and asset prices. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 107, 715-739. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jfineco.2012.11.002 
Zank, H. (2012). A genuine foundation for prospect theory. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 45, 97-113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-012-9150-8 
Zhenxu, T. (2010). CEO risk incentives and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 37, 1248-1280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
5957.2010.02208.x 
Zheng, L., & Zhou, X. (2012). Executive stock options and manipulated stock-price 
129 
 
performance. International Review of Finance, 12(3), 249-281. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01146.x 
Zohrabi, M. (2013). Mixed method research: Instruments, validity, reliability and 
reporting findings. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 3, 254-262. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4304/tpls.3.2.254-262 
Zondervan, A. (2015). Examining CEO Compensation and financial performance in the 
U.S property casualty insurance industry (Doctoral dissertation). Available from 











Appendix B: Summary Compensation Table for Pfizer 
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1 ABBV 26 CBM 51 INFI 76 PBH
2 ABT 27 CBST 52 INSY 77 PCRX
3 ACT 28 CELG 53 IPXL 78 PCYC
4 AEGR 29 CL 54 IRWD 79 PFE
5 AGIO 30 COO 55 ISIS 80 PGNX
6 AGN 31 CORI 56 ITMN 81 PRGO
7 AKRX 32 CPIX 57 JNJ 82 PTX
8 ALIM 33 CSII 58 LCI 83 REGN
9 ALKS 34 CTIC 59 LFVN 84 RPTP
10 ALNY 35 CTLT 60 LGND 85 SCLN
11 ALXN 36 DNDN 61 LLY 86 SCMP
12 AMAG 37 EBS 62 MDCO 87 SGNT
13 AMLN 38 ECYT 63 MDVN 88 SLXP
14 AMPH 39 ENDP 64 MGNX 89 SPPI
15 ANIP 40 ENTA 65 MJN 90 SUPN
16 APHB 41 EPZM 66 MRK 91 UTHR
17 ARNA 42 FMI 67 MYL 92 VIVO
18 ARRY 43 FURX 68 NATR 93 VRTX
19 AUXL 44 GSK 69 NEOG 94 VRX
20 AVNR 45 Halo 70 NKTR 95 VVUS
21 BDSI 46 HSP 71 OMED 96 XNPT
22 BDY 47 HZNP 72 ONXX 97 ZGNX
23 BMRN 48 IMGN 73 OPHT 98 ZTS
24 BMY 49 INBP 74 OPK 99 ZYS
25 CAPS 50 INCR 75 OREX
Tickers for Pharmaceutical Companies used in the Study
